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Epifani  reviews the micro-level  evidence  on the effects of  0  There  is evidence of a pro-competitive  effect of
trade and investment  liberalization  in the developing  trade liberalization.
world.  He focuses, in particular, on the  effects of the  o There is no evidence  either of learning-by-exporting
1991  trade reform in India since it provides  an exczllent  effects  or of beneficial  spillover cffects from foreign-
controlled  experiment  in which the effects of a drastic  owned to local firms active in the same sectors.
trade regime change can  be measured.  His main findings  o There is evidence, however,  of positive  vertical
are:  spillovers  from foreign direct invcstment.
o There  is evidence  of trade-induced  productivity gains  o There is evidence  of skill  upgrading induced either
(in this respect, however, India is an  exception).  by technology  imports or by traee-induced  reallocations
o These gains mainly stem from intra-industry  of market shares  in favor of plants with higher slcill-
reallocation of resources  among firms with different  intensity.
productivity  levels  '  There is no evidence  of trade-induced  increases  in
o  The gains are larger in import-competing  sectors.  lbor demand elasticities. But direct cvidence  suggests
o  There is no  evidence  of significant scale efficiency  that trade exposure raises wage  volatility.
gains. Unilateral  trade liberalization  is often associated  - There is no evidence  of substantial employment
with a  reduced scale efficiency.  contraction  in import-competing  sectors.
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In the last decades,  many developing countries  (e g,  Chile in the late 1970s,  Turkey in 1983, Mexico
in 1985,  Colombia in 1990-91,  India in  1991)  have undergone a deep economic transformation  which
has  involved  a  process  of  dramatic trade  hberalization.  This  paper  reviews  the main  erhpirical
studies using  firm  and  plant-level  panel  data to  investigate  the  effects  of trade  reforms  on firm
performance  and  labor  market  outcomes  in developing  countries.  We  discuss,  in  particular,  the
effects  of the  1991  trade  reform  in India,  since  it provides  an  excellent  controlled  experiment  in
whuch the effects of a drastic trade regime change  can  be measured
The allocative efficiency argument  for free trade has been extensively debated  by the traditional
trade  theory  in  the  context  of perfectly  competitive markets  Since  the late  1970s,  however,  the
so-called  new  trade theory  has  shown  that  the gains  from  trade  originating  from  specialization
according to comparative  advantage are only part of the story,  since in the presence  of imperfectly
competitive  markets  trade  liberalization  can  bring  additional  gains  by  reducing the  deadweight
losses created by  domestic firms' market  power.  In particular,  it has been argued  that trade liber-
alization,  by  increasing  competition,  forces firms to lower  price-marginal  cost  mark-ups  and hence
move  down  their  average  cost  curves,  thereby  raising  firm  size  and  scale  efficiency.  Recently,  it
2has also been shown that in the presence  of within-industry  firm heterogeneity,  trade liberalization
causes more productive  firms to expand  at the expense  of less efficient  firms  (which  either shrink
or exit),  thereby  inducing  additional efficiency  gains  Moreover,  trade  and investment  liberaliza-
tion may foster technology  advancement  and productivity  growth in developing  countries through
several channels,  such as technology advancement embodied in imported capital goods and interme-
diate inputs,  technology  transfers  accompanying  foreign  direct  investment,  learning-by-exporting
effects,  etc.
In the  last decade,  a number  of empirical  works  have resorted  to  firm and  plant-level  panel
data to see whether  the predicted  gains from trade liberalization  have  materializedi  in some recent
episodes of drastic trade reform in the developing world.  Most of these studies find that trade reform
in developing countries was indeed accompanied  by productivity growth, technology advancement,
falling mark-ups  and a reshuffling  of resources  toward the  more  efficient  firms,  although  in some
cases  the evidence  may fail  to  convince because  of the hurdles involved  in the methodology used
in  these studies.  This is  true,  in  particular,  for India,  where  in some  cases  studies  using slightly
different  methodologies  find  opposite  results.  However,  aside  from  methodological  issues,  India
seems an exception with respect to other trade liberalizing developing countries,  since most studies
find that the  1991  trade  reform was  in fact accompanied  by a reduced productivity  growth.  One
explanation for this result is that India is still a heavily regulated economy, and hence the expected
benefits of industrial restructuring and of the trade-induced reallocation  of resources  are probably
smaller and will  take longer  to materialize.
Although the efficiency  argument for trade liberalization  has generally  been accepted,  the main
argument  against trade reform  in the developing countries  that have  opted  for ar  import  substi-
tution industrialization  strategy  has often been that trade  liberalization  would  exacerbate  income
inequality and hence deteriorate the conditions of the poor.  In particular, concerns  regarding higher
unemployment  among  workers displaced  by the contraction  of import  competing sectors,  greater
uncertainty  and precariousness  of job  conditions,  and the creation  of new  job opportunities only
3for the most  qualified segments  of the  workforce  have often been  deemed  inevitable consequences
of trade  liberalization.
In this respect,  the traditional  trade  theory  (which  removes,  by  assumption,  uncertainty  and
unemployment)  should  have  been  reassuring,  since  its  most  celebrated  theorem  (the  Stolper-
Samuelson  theorem)  predicts  that  a  skill-poor  developing  country  opening  up  to  international
competition  will experience  a  reduction  in  wage  income  inequality  However,  the  empirical  evi-
dence  contradicts this prediction, since it  shows that  the recent  episodes  of trade  liberalization in
developing  countries  are  generally  accompanied  by a dramatic  increase  in  wage  inequality  The
recent theoretical  and empirical  literature  can explain  this puzzling evidence,  since it shows that in
the presence of imperfectly competitive  markets, increasing  returns to scale and firm heterogeneity,
trade hberalization  can  indeed exacerbate  wage inequality  even  in a skill-poor  developing country
Plant-level  evidence  also  shows  that  trade  reforms  in developing  countries  do not  generally
bring a sharp contraction  of import competing  skill-intensive  sectors.  Further, the evidence shows
that trade exposure  is associated  with a greater wage volatility, but also with a greater  investment
in  technology and human capital  This  evidence,  too, can generally  be explained  by trade models
based on  increasing returns  to scale and  imperfectly competitive  markets.
A  few  recent  papers  address  related  issues from  different  perspectives.  Harrison  and Hanson
(1999)  focus  on three empirical  issues concerning the impact of trade  reform  First,  they  address
the question  of the weak econometric  link  between  trade  policy  and  long-run  growth,  and  argue
that  it  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that,  because  of  the  lack  of data,  trade  policy  cannot  yet  be
measured adequately  The second and  third  issues addressed by the authors are the small impact
on employment  and the large Impact on  wage  inequality  of trade reforms  in developing  countries
We  will  mention their  results on  these topics  in  the  second  part of the paper  Matusz  and Tarr
(1999),  and Bacchetta  and  Jansen  (2001)  survey  the  evidence  on  the adjustment  costs  of trade
liberalization  They  show  that  the  overwhelming  majority  of the  studies  find  that  adjustment
costs  are small  in relation  to  the benefits  of trade  liberalization  Finally,  Tybout  (2001)  reviews
4the  plant-level  evidence  in  the light  of the new  trade  theory.  Our  work  is  complementary  to
his, since  our review  also extends  to the  effects  of trade  reforms  on the labor markcets  and, most
important,  it provides a more extensive treatment of the theoretical foundations of empirical work.
The paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2  illustrates  the theoretical  predictions  concerning
the effects  of trade liberalization  on firm  performance.  Section  3  discusses  the  relevance  of these
effects  for  trade  liberalizing developing  countries  in the  light of the micro-level  evidence.  Section
4 reports the plant-level  evidence on the impact of trade liberalization on  learning and technology
diffusion.  Sections  5  and 6  examine the labor  market outcomes  of trade  liberalization  Section  7
analyzes  the effects  of the  1991 trade  liberalization  in India.  Section 8 concludes.
2  Thade  Uleralbe  atio  and ISr  PeirarmT  cze
When markets are imperfectly competitive, trade liberalization  may affect firm-level  variables, such
as mark-ups,  size and productivity  This section illustrate these  effects, while  the next reviews the
plant-level  evidence on their empirical  relevance.
To  see  how  trade  liberalization  can  affect  firm  performance,  first  consider  a  simple  setting
with  representative  firms 1  Next  we  will  show that  more  can  be  learned  by  alloving for  firm
heterogeneity.  Consider  then n identical  firms  competing  d  la  Cournot  in  a  sector producing  a
homogeneous  good.  Aggregate demand has a constant elasticity a.  Technology features plant-level
scale economies  and  is summarized by the  following total  cost function.
TC = f  1  q  (1)
where q is firm output, f  is a fixed overhead cost and 1/40  is a constant marginal  cost.  Both f  and
1/0 are in terms of labor,  the only production factor,  chosen as numeraire.  Profit maximization  by
TiTIs  vxa,uple  (Iraws  on  Markusen  (1981).  Sunilai  results  indei  different  abbumuptions  about nmarket  struc.ture
(an  be  foiind  iu Krugman  (1979)  ancd  Helpmuan  and Krugman  (1985)
5individual  firms (taking the output of rivals as given)  implies  the following mark-up pricing rule
_ _  _  _  -(2)
an-1 ,(
Equation  (2) is crucial for understanding the pro-competitive  effect of trade liberalization.  It shows
that  a  firm's  price-marginal  cost  mark-up,  f,n  , depends  negatively  on  the perceived  product
demand elasticity,  (Tn.  Thus, when  firms face a fiercer competition due to a rise in the number  (n)
of rivals, they  perceive a higher  demand elasticity and consequently  lower their mark-up.
With unrestricted  entry, profits  (ir)  are zero in  equilibrium:
7r  =  (p-  /I)q-f  =  O  =>  q = fv((an-1)  (3)
Finally,  full employment  of labor  (L)  requires:
L = nl = n(f + q/p)  (4)
where  1 =  f  + q/l  represents  labor  employed  by  each  firm.  Solving equations  (3)  and  (4)  for  n
and q gives.
(>f  )  '  g  f'# [(YL  _  )  1  (5)
It  can  be  shown  that  trade  integration  among  countries  with  similar  tastes  and  technology  is
formally  equivalent  to an  increase in the size of the economy,  as captured by an increase  in L.  The
effects  on firm  performance are straightforward:
1)  Equation  (5)  shows  that trade integration  (i.e.,  a rise  in  L)  raises  the  number of firms  n.
From  (2),  this implies  that.firms  perceive a higher  demand  elasticity  and hence  lower their  price
and mark-up.  This is the pro-compettttve effect of trade integration
2)  Trade  integration  raises firm  size q  (see equation  (5))
63) The trade-induced increase in firm size raises firm productivity  (given by q/l) due to a better
exploitation  of scale economies.  This is the scale effictency gazn from trade integration.
2. I  Tntroducing firm heteroge neity
The  above  results  have  been  derived  from  a  setting with  representative  firms  Several  reasons
suggests,  however,  to extend  the general  equilibrium  trade  models to allow  for firm  heterogeneity.
In particular:
1)  Recent  work inter alta by Roberts and Tybout (1996),  Olley and Pakes (1996),  Aw, Chen and
Roberts  (1997)  reports evidence of a significant degree  of within-industry plant-level  heterogeneity.
Hence,  allowing for  firm heterogeneity  may add an important element of realism to the framework
of analysis.
2)  Micro-level  empirical  evidence  shows that exporting firms have different characteristics  with
respect  to  non-exporting  firms.  In  particular,  the  former  are larger,  more  efficient,  more  skill-
intensive  and pay  higher wages  (Bernard and Jensen,  1997,  1999;  Clerides et  al.,  1998).
3) Most plant-level empirical studies show that trade-induced  productivity gains stemrning from
the  reshuffling of resources between  plants with different productivity  levels are more relevant  than
the scale efficiency  gains due to a better exploitation of plant-level  scale economies  (Tybout,  2001;
Tybout  and Westbrook,  1995;  Pavcnik,  2002).  Therefore,  trade  models  based  on representative
firms  may  miss  an  important  mechanism  through  which  trade  reform  affects  the  allocation  of
resources,  aggregate  productivity  and income  inequality.
One of the most rigorous attempts to embed  firm heterogeneity into a general  equilibrium trade
model  is provided  by  Melitz  (2002),  who generalizes Krugman  (1980)  by dropping the assumption
of symmetric  firms2. This model provides  new insights on the impact of trade liberalization  on the
intra-industry  reallocation  of resources  and can  help explain  the stylized  facts mentioned  above.
2Althoiigh  Krugmian  (1980)  is  a  cornerstone of the  new  trade  theory,  it is uninteresting  (in  thQ  absence  of firm
heterogeneity)  fioni  the standpoint  of  the effects  of  trade  liberalization  on  firn  performance  The reason  is  that,
siiic in tlus model firnsb  face a constant  demnand  elastiLity,  trade integration  hab no effects on firms'  ruark-upb, and
ou their size  anud  pioductivity
7On  the  demand  side,  the  model  features  love  for  variety,  captured  by  a standard  CES  util-
ity  function,  as  in  Krugman  (1980)  The  production  side  of the economy  is  characterized  by a
continuum  of firms, each  producing  a  different  variety.  The  technology  features  plant-level  scale
economies  and  is summarized  by  a total cost  function as  in equation  (1),  TC(cp) = f  + q/l.  The
only  difference  is that  now  firms  have different  productivity  levels,  indexed by  W. Hence,  W cap-
tures firm heterogeneity in this model.  Firms face a demand  curve with a constant elasticity (a > 1
Profit  maximuzation  imphes  the  familiar  mark-up  pricing  rule,  p(W)  =  '  I  Firms'  profits  are
then  xr(p)  =  r(p)/a -f,  where r(W) is  revenue  It can  be shown that the ratios of any two firms'
outputs and revenues only depend  on the ratio of their  productivity  levels:
q_(__)  ( W,  ) e  (  )  )  A  (6)
q(~'2)  Y'P2 J  r(W2)  'Pi2J
Equation  (6)  and the expressions  for  p(w)  and 7r(g)  show  that  more  productive firms  (i  e.,  firms
with a higher W) are bzgger,  charge a lower price and earn hzgher profits than less productive firms.
The equilibrium  aggregate price  index P  is a generalization  of the standard  price index associ-
ated with a  CES utility function:
P =  [L  p(P)"-npl(W)d  W] TI7(7)
where  ji(o)  is the equilibrium  distribution  of productivity  levels  and n is  the equilibrium  number
of firms.  Using the expression  for p(W),  the price  index can  be written  as
P = n  p  p(b) = n  ee  (8)
where  io  is  the weighted  average  of firms'  productivity  levels.  Note  that the inverse  of the price
index  equals  real  per  capita  income  W  (i e,  W  =  P-1)  Hence,  as  in  Krugman  (1980),  both
an  increase  in the  number  of available  varieties  n  and  in  the  average  productivity  ,  raise  real
8per  capita  income  and  welfare.  However,  while  in Krugman  (1980)  the average  o:oductivity  is
exogenously  given  and  trade  reform  can  only  exert its  effects  through  an  increase  in n,  in this
model  o is endogenous  and hence it can be  influenced by trade integration.
Melitz  shows  that  in  the  absence  of any  trade  costs,  a  move  from  autarky  to free trade  has
no  effect  on  the  distribution  of  productivity  levels  and  average  productivity.  In  this case,  the
effects  of trade  integration  are  identical  to those  predicted  by Krugman  (1980),  i.e.,  a welfare
increasing expansion  in product  variety, and firm heterogeneity has no impact on average industry
productivity.
In order to give firm heterogeneity  an important role to play,  two routes can  be taken.  One is
to relax the assumption of an exogenously  fixed demand elasticity  (a) for each variety.  The other
is to assume  the existence  of sunk entry costs into foreign markets.
As far as the  former  is concerned,  (in a separate appendix)  Melitz  shows that, even  in the  ab-
sence of any  trade costs,  firm heterogeneity is  crucial for the impact  of trade when firms'  demand
elasticity  endogenously increases  with product  variety,  as in Krugman  (1979).  In this case,  trade
integration among two identical countries expands the variety of products  and henca  increases  the
elasticity  of substitution  among  them.  In turn,  an increased  elasticity  of substitution  induces a
reallocation  of market  shares  towards  more efficient  firms and  thus generates  an aggregate  pro-
ductivity  gain.  The intuition for  this result  is that  a higher elasticity  of substitution  generates a
premium  in terms of market  shares in favor of firms charging a lower price,  i.e.,  the more efficient
ones.
The second setting carefully  explored  by  Melitz  builds on the assumption  of sunkc entry  costs
into  foreign  markets.  Melitz  refers  to  the results  of empirical  studies  confirming  that firms face
significant fixed costs associated with the  entry into foreign markets:  "These costs are related to
the  fact that a firm  must  find and  inform foreign  buyers  about its product  and learn  about  the
foreign market.  Further, it must adapt its product to foreign standards and set up new distribution
channels in the foreign  country".
9The assumption  that exporting  firms face  a fixed  cost  of exporting  has striking implications 3
In the presence  of firm heterogeneity,  only the more efficient  ones can afford to pay the fixed  cost of
exporting  Hence, these costs generate a partition of firms into exporting and non-exporting  firms
The former  sell  to both the domestic  and  the foreign  markets,  whereas the latter  only sell to the
domestic  market  Hence,  this partition of firms implies  that exporting  firms are larger  and  more
productive than non-exporting  firms, and this is consistent with the plant-level  empirical evidence
This setting based on firm heterogeneity  and fixed costs of exporting can help explain the effects
of trade  liberalization  on intra-industry  reallocation  of resources  and  aggregate  productivity  In
particular,  it  allows  to explain  the  empirical  finding that output share  reallocations  among  firms
with  different  productivity  levels  are  the main  source  of  trade-induced  productivity  gains.  The
intuition  is the following.  In the trade regime,  all domestic  firms face  foreign competition  in their
domestic  market,  which  induces  a loss of revenue  and market  share.  For  non-exporting  firms this
translates  into a loss of profits.  Among these non-exporting  firms,  the less efficient  incur  negative
profits and exit,  whereas the other non-exporting  firms survive  with a lower  market share than in
autarky.  Conversely,  exporting firms  expand their market share and profits because  their access to
foreign markets  more  than  compensate  the loss of revenue  in  the domestic  market.  Hence,  trade
induces both the  exzt  of less efficient firms and the reallocatton of market shares towards the more
efficient  exportzng firms.  Both effects contrbute to an mncrease zn  average productivity.
'Iln  ection  5  we will see  that, as shown  by Manasse  and  Tturrini (2001), the interaction  of fixed  costs of exporting
itiid  fain  hLetetugeneity  has  also  striking  implications  with  regard  to  the  effects  of  tiade  liberalization  on  wage
inie(qiuaihty
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3.1  Evidence  on the prc-co=aetitive  e0b:ct, of trade  1iHerEal'atlon
The  pro-competitive  effect  of trade  liberalization  has  traditionally  been  investigated  by  using
industry-level  data.  Thls literature  exemnes  the correlation  between  trade  exposure  and  price-
cost margins  at the industry  level,  using import  penetration rates as a measure of trade exposure.
Empirical  studies  for industrial  countries  (see,  for  instance,  Schmalensee,  1989)  show  a negative
corielation  between  price-costs  margins  and  import  competition,  especially  when  domestic  con-
centration  is  high.  This  result  is consistent  with  the argument  that import  competition reduces
profits  in  industries which  enjoy above normal  returns.
5
As for the developing world, the country studies reported in Roberts  and Tybout (1996),  relative
to Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Morocco  and  Turkey,  add to the  standard  industry-level  analysis  a
study  of the correlation  between  trade  exposure  and  price  cost-margins at  the  plant-level,  to see
whether  the observed  effects  at the industry-level  Ere common  to all  producers  in an industry or
are  concentrated in a subset  of producers
3.1.1  Industry-level  evidence
As  far as  the industry-level  analysis is concerned,  the country  studies use the industry-level  price-
cost margin  to measure industry-level  performance.  It is immediate to show that, if we assume that
unit expenditures  on labor  and materials  are constant with  respect  to output,  then the price-cost
margin  is a monotonic transformation  of the price-marginal  cost mark-up.  The price-cost  margin
in  industry  j  at time t, PCM,t, is measured  as  the value of output  (P,tQ,t) minus expenditures
4See  also  Tybout  (2001)  on the  topics  covered  in  this scetion.
'Usilig  a data set  coimprisilig  28  indubtries in 42 developed  and clevelopmg  countries  for  18 years, Hoekcian  andl
KIce  (2003)  fihod  in a iccent  paper  that import  o:rplctition significantly  reduces  inciistry mark-upi.
aTlie autilios of the country  studies reportedl  in Roberts  and Tybouit  (1996) are  J  Tybouit for Chile  (ch 9),  M
Folbcrts  foi  Colomnbia  (ch 10),  .1  -M. Grcther  for Mexico (cl  11),  M  Haddad, J. (le Melo and B  Horton  for Morocco
(clh  12)  and  F  Forouitan  for Tuirkey  (c1  13)on labor  and materials over  the value  of output.  It equals profits  (H 3t)  plus payments  to capital
as a proportion  of the industry's  value of output:
PCM 1 , =  (fl3 t + (rt + 6)K,t) /P,tQ,j  (9)
where Kt is  capital stock,  rt  is the competitive  gross return  on capital  and  6 is the depreciation
rate  Equation  (9)  shows  that sectoral  PCMs are influenced  by  both  the rate of profit  and the
capital intensity.  The country  studies use the following basic model:
PCM,t = f (H 1t, IMP,t, H,t  IMPt, Ktl/Q,t, I,, Tt)  (10)
Here,  H,1 is  the  Herfindahl  index,  an  index  of  industry structure  which  is  inversely  correlated
with  the  degree  of competition  among  domestic  producers.  IMP,t is  the  import  penetration
ratio;  the  pro-competitive  effect  of trade  liberalization  should  show  up  as a negative  correlation
between the price-cost margin  and import penetration.  The interaction term H,t- IMP,t tests the
hypothesis  that,  if  highly  concentrated  industries  enjoy above  normal  profits  because  of market
power,  then they  should  be  more sensitive to  foreign  competition.  Kjt/Q3t  is  the capital-output
ratio, which controls for sectoral differences  in capital-intensity  (see  equation  (9)).  Finally,  I,  and
Tt  are industry and time  dummies,  respectively.
Since most  of variation  in the panel  data used  in these  country  studies  is across  industries,  it
is not surprising that the estimation  results crucially depend on whether or not industry dummies
are  included  in the  regression  equation  When  industry  dummies  are excluded,  four  out of five
countries  studies  (i.e.,  those  for  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico  and Morocco)  find  that the coefficients
of both  IMP,t and  H,t  IMP 3 t  are  negative  and highly  significant.  This suggests  that  import
competition is negatively correlated with sectoral profitability  and that the effect is larger for highly
concentrated  industries
These results are substantially  weakened,  however,  when industry dummies are included in the
12regression equation  Note that  in this case estimated  coefficients  only reflect temporal variation  in
the data, and hence they are better suited to isolate the pro-competitive  effect of increased foreign
competition.  The country  studies show that, when  industry dummies  are included,  evidence  of a
significant  pro-competitive  effect of trade  hberalization  is found only in Colombia and Mexico
3.1.2  Plant-level evidence
The country  studies  also examine  the pro-competitive  effect  of foreign competition  by looking  at
plant-level  evidence  on price-costs  margins.  They use the following basic model.
PCM,,=  f(S,,t,  S,2,,, IMP7t S  .,t IMP 1 t, K 3tIQ,I,,Tt)  (11)
where PCM,,t is the price-cost margin of plant i in  industry . and time t,  S5,t is the share of plant
i's output in  sector j's total domestic  production,  and  the other variables  in  (11)  have the  same
interpretation  as  in equation  (10).  The interaction  term  S,,t  IMP7, tests  the  hypothesis  that
the pro-competitive  effect  of foreign  competition  is stronger  among firms  with a higher domestic
market  share.
The coefficient  of the linear term S,,t is generally  positive and significant,  whereas  that of the
quadratic term S,  is generally negative.  This suggests that price-costs margins rise at a decreasing
rate with market  shares.  More  interestingly,  in every  country  studied the  coefficients  on  IMP1t
and S,,,  IMP,,, are  negative  and highly significant,  whereas  industry dummies  do not generally
have any explanatory  power.  Thus, exposure to foreign competition is associated  with lower price-
cost  margins,  and  the  effect  is  concentrated  among  the  large  plants.  This result  suggests  that
looking at plant-level evidence  highlights a powerful and systematic  pro-competitive  role of foreign
competition.
133.2  Plant-level evidence  on trade-induced  productivity  gains
The literature  which uses plant-level  data to investigate the productivity  gains from trade  liberal-
ization shows mixed results.  Tybout, de Melo  and Corbo (1991)  find little evidence of productivity
growth  in manufacturing  after  trade  reform  in Chile  Conversely,  Harrison  (1994)  finds  a signif-
icant productivity  increase  after  trade liberalization  in Cote d'Ivoire.  In  section  7,  we  show that
empirical  works  using  a similar  methodology  find  opposite  results  with regard  to the  effects  of
the  1991  trade liberalization  in India.  In this section,  we  briefly review  two recent  studies  which
will help us clarify  the methodological  hurdles involved  in estimating  the effect of trade reform  on
productivity.
Tybout and Westbrook  (1995) use plant-level panel data to study the efficiency gains induced by
the Mexico trade liberalization.  Prior to 1985, Mexico was an inward-looking economy due to heavy
policies  of trade protection  7  In  1985,  the Mexican  government announced  its decision to join the
GATT and undertook major reforms leading to a reduction in tariffs by 45% and import licenses by
more than  75%  within three years.  Hence,  the Mexican  experience  provides an interesting  setting
to study  the empirical  relevance  of trade-induced  productivity  gains in developing  countries.
The methodology  employed by Tybout and Westbrook allows them to disentangle three poten-
tial sources  of productivity gains.  The first  derives from  exploitation of scale economies  As shown
in Section 2, trade integration,  by increasing  the perceived  product demand  elasticity, causes  firms
to  loose market  power  and forces  them  down their  average  cost  curves,  thereby  inducing  scale
efficiency gains.  The  second source  of productivity  gains derives  from  market share reallocations
among  plants  with  different  levels  of efficiency  As  shown  in Section  2, in  the presence  of sub-
stantial  firm  heterogeneity,  market  share reallocations  can be  a relevant  source of trade-induced
productivity  gains.  Finally,  the authors  include a catch-all  residual term which captures  changes
in productivity not accounted  for  by scale  effects  or share reallocations,  such as technical  change,
learning-by-doing,  externalities,  capacity utilization,  elimination  of waste,  managerial  effort,  and
7The  (lata  ,isecl  by  the autlhors  are  froni Mexico's  Annual Industrial  Survey  and  cover  the period  1984  throtugh
1990) Thc bsamlple  plants  iepresent  80%  of total  oUtput
14so on.  The main findings  of Tybout  and Westbrook  are the following.
a)  Scale efficiency effects  Most  manufacturing sectors  show increasing returns  to scale,  and for
the smallest plants in these industries returns to scale are often relevant (as high as  1 2).  However,
the largest  plants  in these industries generally  appear  to have reached  a minimum  efficient  scale.
Thus,  given  that large plants  account  for a disproportionate  share  of sectoral  output,  industrial
expansion does  not induce large  gains  in scale  efficiency.  More precisely,  the mean output  growth
was  more  than  50%  in  the period  198&1990.  But  despite  this  substantial  output  growth,  the
exploitation  of scale economies  accounts  for  only the  0.55%  rise in average  productivity.  These
results suggest that the focus of trade models with imperfect  competition  and representative firms
on the  gains  from  scale  economies  exploitation  may  be somewhat  misplaced,  since  these  gains
appear modest in magnitude.
b)  Output share reallocatzons. This effect accounts for more than 1% rise in average productivity
Although  this  figure  is  quite  modest,  it  suggests  that  output  share  reallocations  among  firms
with different  productivity  levels mighit  be empirically  more  relevant  than scale  efficiency  effects,
and  hence  that firm  heterogeneity  can  be  a key  determinant  of the  efficiency  geans  from  trade
liberalization
c)  Residual effect.  Most of the average increase  in productivity comes from the cetch-all residual
effect, which accounts for 9.6% rise in average productivity.  This implies that most of the estimated
overall efficiency  gains (11  16%)  are indeed  left unexplained.
The  above  results must  be  interpreted  with caution,  because  of the  hurdles  involved  in the
methodology  used  by  Tybout  and  Westbrook,  which  are  common,  however,  to  most  analyses
of the efficiency  gains  from  trade  liberalization.  The main methodological  problems  involved  in
estimating  the productivity  gains from trade  reform  can  be  summarized  as follows  (see  Pavcnik,
2002).
1)  Identificatzon of the trade effects  In most studies,  the identification  of trade effects relies  on
the comparison  of plant  productivity  before  and  after  a trade policy  change.  As  a consequence,
15this  approach attributes  productivity  changes  originating  from other  sources  to trade  policy.  To
see  how serious  this  problem  can  be,  note  that most studies  use  data  covering  only  a short  time
period  after trade  reform,  which  implies  that the estimates  of productivity  growth can  be heavily
affected by the cyclical behavior of the economy  in the aftermath  of the reform.  Note,  further, that
in  some episodes  of trade  liberalization,  a deep  economic  downturn  is  often  the trigger  of these
reforms,  and  hence  productivity  gains  from  liberalization  can  be  underestimated  if a prolonged
recession  leads  to reduced  capacity  utilization
2)  Simultanesty  bias  Assume  that plant  i's  technology  is  described  by the  following  Cobb-
Douglas production function:
+  it + e,t;  eit = wit + e6  (12)
J=1
where  all  variables  are in  logarithms,  y,t  is output  and  x,,  is the  7th  input.  The  error  term  e,t
is  composed  of a stochastic  disturbance  e,t  plus an  unobserved  plant-specific  efficiency  term  w,t
Note  that,  since  more productive  plants  are  willing  to  hire  more  inputs,  the error  term  e,t  is
positively  correlated  with  factor  inputs.  This  implies that  OLS estimates  (or  between  estimates,
as in Tybout and Westbrook,  1995)  of the production function coefficients  are biased upward,  thus
involving  biased estimates of w,j 8
In some  cases  (e g,  in  Harrison,  1994)  this  problem  has  been  tackled  by  assuming  that the
plant-specific  efficiency  term  is  time-invariant,  which  allows  to  estimate  equation  (12)  using  a
fixed  effects  estimator.  This approach  only removes  the  bias originating  from the time-invariant
component  of plant-specific  efficiency,  so it  does not solve  the problem completely.  What  is more
worrisome,  however,  is  that  this approach,  by  treating plant-specific  efficiency  as  time-invariant,
also removes the possibility  to measure how it evolves  after trade reform.
Hence,  in  general,  the  simultaneity  problem  is  either neglected  or  tackled  improperly  in the
"EbtiLnatteb  of Wt,  le irn  fact. basel on the difference  between  actuial  o,itpnit and oitpiot  predicte(d  from  estimates
of the  prod  htion  fonction  coefficients
16literature.
3) Self-selection bzas.  The literature  generally  neglects the self-selection  bias  induced by plant
closing  Pavcnik  (2002)  shows  that,  under  certain  conditions,  a  negative  correlation  is  to  be
expected  between the efficiency  term La,,  and capital stock,  conditional  on  surviving plants.  This
implies that the estimated coefficient of capital stock in production  function (12)  is generally biased
downward.
Pavcnik  (2002)  proposes  an  alternative  methodology  which  addresses  most of these  issues  In
particular,  the problem of identification  of the trade effects  is addressed by comparing plants' pro-
ductivity  growth  in the export  oriented  and  import  competing  sectors  with  that of firms  in  the
iion-traded  sector  The simultaneity  ard self-selection  biases  are addressed  by  using a semipara-
metric procedure  in  which the  plant-specific efficiency  term is  modeled as  a time-varying  function
of capital  and investment "
Pavcnik implements her methodology using data on Chilean manufacturing  plants for the period
1979  to  1986,  i.e,  in the aftermath  of a drastic  trade  hberalization.  Plants are  partitioned  into
three  groups.  Plants  belonging  to  a  4-digit ISIC  industry  exporting  more than  15%  of its  total
output are characterized  as export oriented.  Plants belonging to an industry whose ratio of imports
to total output exceed  15%  are instead characterized  as import competing.  The rest  of the plants
belong  to the non-traded  sector.
Pavcnik  uses  the mentioned  procedure  to obtair  consistent estimates  of plants'  productivity
growth in each of these groups.  The results are striking.  In the period 1979-1986, thc productivity
of  export  oriented  plants  grew,  on  average,  by  25.4%,  that of  import competing  plants  grew  by
even more  (31  9%),  while that of plants  in the non-traded  sector grew by only 6 2%.  These results
suggest  a  dramatic  productivity  growth  differential  in  favor  of plants  exposed  to  international
competition  with  respect  to  inward-oriented  plants.  They  also  suggest  that,  in  the  case  of a
"Siruilarly, a  re(eut  paper by  Fernandez  (2002)  uses a  panel of Colomubian  plants from  1977  to  1091 to estimate
pio(luation  functionis separately across  manufacturing  industries  These estimates  are then used  to dcerive plant-level
tilue-varying  productivity  meastues  She  finds  a btrong  negative  impact  of tradc protection  on  plant  produictivity
17unilateral  trade  liberalization  (such  as the one  experienced  by Chile),  trade-induced  productivity
gains can  be higher for import  competing  plants  relative  to export oriented  plants
Pavcnik  also  uses a procedure  similar  to  that  used  by  Tybout and  Westbrook  (1995)  to  dis-
entangle  the  contribution  of output  share  reallocations  among  firms  with  different  productivity
levels  to productivity  growth  She finds  that  in the  export  oriented  sector,  average  productivity
growth  due  to  output  share  reallocations  equals  16 6%,  while  the  rest  (8 7%)  is  due to  within
plants productivity  growth  The  figures for the import competing  sector and the non-traded  sector
are,  respectively,  21 3%  and  10 7%,  and  2 4%  and  3 8%  These  results  strongly  suggest  that the
reshuffling  of resources  in  favor of more  productive  firms is  a critical  determinant  of productivity
growth  and  that,  consistent  with  Melitz  (2002)'s  model,  this  effect  can  be largely  due  to  trade
liberalization  ii)
3.3  More  on trade policy and scale efficiency
Tybout  and  Westbrook  (1995)  also  look  at  patterns  of sectoral  change  in  measures  of  foreign
competition to see  whether they  are correlated  with estimated productivity  changes.  Correlations
are generally  insignificant.  The only robust finding  is that heightened  import competition  reduces
scale efficiency.  This result seems to contradict one of the main predictions of the simplest models of
the new trade theory (such as the one illustrated in Section 2),  i e , that in the presence  of imperfect
competition the trade-induced  increase  in firm size  can be an  important source  of efficiency  gains
Indeed,  most general  equilibrium  models  based  on  imperfect  competition  (see,  for  instance,  Cox
and Harris,  1985)  predict  that  trade liberalization  will  generate  welfare  gains primarily  through
the mechanism of increased  scale
The  empirical  evidence  on the  effects of trade liberalization  on firm size is mixed  Roberts  and
Tybout  (1991)  find that higher import penetration  is  associated  with lower  employment  per plant
'"Coli.istent with  thc,e  resildts,  uibng  data  on  Brazilian  rianifactiring,  Miiendiler  (2002)  finds  thilt  thle  shut-
(II)wii  piohl,ality  of inefficient  firms  lises  with competition  frorii  abroad,  thiis contributing  positively  to  aiggregate
p1  uod,ct.ivity
18in  Chile  and  Colombia.  Conversely,  other works  on developed countries  find  that th-e  removal  of
tariff protection  increases output."1
The theoretical  literature emphasizes  that the effects of trade policy in the presence of imperfect
competition  are  generally  sensitive  to the specific  assumptions  concerning  market  structure  and
industry characteristics.  Following Head and Ries (1999),  now  we argue that a slight  modification
of the simple  model illustrated  in Section  2 can help explain the finding of Tybout and Westbrook
(1995)  that increased  import competition  may reduce  firm size and scale  efficiency.
Consider n domestic firms and nt  foreign firms competing  d la Cournot in an industry producing
a homogeneous good.  Domestic and foreign firms employ the same production  technology,  featuring
a fixed  cost f  and a constant marginal cost  1/0.  Markets are segmented,  as in Brander  (1981).  Let
ri, and rf denote the ad valorem  tariffs charged  by the domestic and foreign country,  respectively
The profits  of domestic  and foreign firms  (-r  and  7r',  respectively)  are given by
7r  =  (Ph -l 
5 )qh + (pf/(1  +  rf)-1/1)qf-f  (13)
7r'  =  (pi,/(l + r,,)-1/5)qh  + (pf-  1/0)q'  -f
Here,  ql,  and  qh  denote,  respectively,  domestic  and  foreign  firms'  sales  to the  domestic  market,
whereas  qf  and qr are domestic and foreign  firms' sales to the foreign market, respectively  pi, and
pf are the final consumer prices in the  domestic and foreign market,  respectively.
Since  the  two  markets  are  segmented  (and  marginal  costs  are  constant),  a  firm's  choice  of
output in  one market  is  independent  of its  choice  of output in the other  markcet.  Hence  we  can
concentrate  on the domestic market  to study the impact of rh on ql, and qh, noting that the impact
of rr on qf  is analogous  to that of r1, on q'.  The first order conditions for profit maximization  in
"Sce,  foi  mitance, Baldwin  and Goiecki  (1986)  and Caves  (1984)  for  an analysis of average plant scale  in Canada
anitd  Anistialid,  respectively
19the domestic  market are  given  by:
a--r  =  phqh+Ph-1/0=0  (14)
87r*  =phql*,  + pi, -(1+T,/  0
Totally  differentiating  equations  (14)  with  respect  to  qh,  qh  and  rh,  using  Cramer's  rule  and
assuming  that firms' outputs are strategic  substitutes,  it is  possible to show that:
- > 0,  aq  <0  (15)
Inequalities  in  (15)  show  that a home  tariff  raises  output  per  firm  in the domestic  country  and
lowers output per firm  in the foreign  country.  Similarly,  a foreign  tariff raises output per  firm in
the foreign  country  and lowers output per firm  in the domestic  country.  The  intuition is that a
home  tariff  raises  the marginal  cost  of foreign  exporting  firms,  forcing  them  to lower  output  to
raise marginal  revenue  and restore the  equality  between  marginal cost and marginal  revenue.  In
turn, foreign  firms' contraction  allows  domestic  firms to expand.
To sum up, competition a la Cournot in the context of segmented markets implies that unilateral
trade liberalization  by the domestic  country  reduces  firm size  and scale  efficiency  in the domestic
country  and  raises  scale  efficiency  in the  foreign  country.'2 This  result  may  help  explain  why
empirical studies often find that increased import competition due to unilateral trade liberalization
reduces  firm size in  developing  countries
Head and Ries (1999)  test the implications of this model using a panel of 230  Canadian 4-digit
SIC industries  for the period  1987-1994.  The focus  of their  empirical analysis  is on the effects  on
firm  size  of the  1988  Canada-U.S  F'ree  Trade  Agreement,  which  led  to a  gradual  bilateral  tariff
"Head  aud  Ries  (1999)  show that this result holds also  under the assumption  of free  entry of firms
20removal between the  two countries  Their basic regression  equation is:
Ilnqtt  =  %±+ Pt +yc.'ArCA +  zUSrY  t  + eSt  (16)
where q,j, is average output per plant  in the ith industry at time t, a.  and /3t are industry and time
fixed effects, respectively,  rCA  and rus are the industry tariff rates charged  by the Canadian  and
U S  governments,  respectively,  and et  is an error  term.  Regression  results  show that  Canadian
tariff reductions  lowered plant scale in Canada, while U.S. tariff reductions had the opposite effect.
Both effects are highly significant and quite large in magnitude.  For instance, estimated coefficients
imply that the average reduction of Canadian tariffs  by of 5.4%  caused a 6.1%  scale reduction  in
Canada,  while the average reduction of U.S.  tariffs by 2 8% caused a 4 6% scale incre-se  in Canada.
An other interesting result  is that tariff effects  are smaller  in industries  characterized  by  high
turnover rates  (measured  as the sum of entry and exit divided by the number  of establishments).
This  suggests  that  plant  entry  and exit  dampen  scale  adjustments,  and hence  that  industries
characterized  by  free  entry and exit are  not much  affected  by tariff reductions.  This  result  is  in
line with results reported by Roberts and Tybout  (1991)  for Chile and Colombia,  showing that the
effect of import penetration  on employees  per plant decreases  with industry turnover.
Head  and Ries  also look  at plant  size heterogeneity  to  examine  whether  plants  belonging  to
different  size  groups show  a different  response  to trade  policy  changes  Their  main result is that
only the scale of large plants is responsive to tariff reductions.  Conversely,  small plants are de facto
insulated from  the effects  of trade liberalization.13
To sum up, the plant-level  evidence illustrated in this section suggests that trade-induced scale
efficiency gains are generally  small in magnitude,  because:  1) a disproportionate  share of industry
output is produced by large firms,  which appear to have reached minimum efficient  scale;  2)  small
plants' output  does  not respond much  to tariff reductions;  3)  entry and exit of firms in response
3Simlilarly,  Fernandez  (2002)  finds  that,  among Colombian  firmis,  the  negative  impact  of protcetion  on produtc-
tivity L8  stionger  for large plants relative  to small plants.
21to changing profit opportunities  lower the quantity  adjustment  by incumbent firms in sectors  with
high turnover  rates  The evidence also shows that unilateral trade  liberalization  generally  reduces
firm size and scale  efficiency in import competing  sectors  This  is not a worrisome  result,  however,
since  the  evidence  also  shows  that,  notwithstanding  this  negative  effect,  overall  trade-induced
productivity  gains are higher in import  competing sectors.
4  Trade and Technology Advancement
In addition  to the static  effects  illustrated in Section  2,  trade liberalization  has also  been  argued
to have  other  static  and dynamic  effects,  most  of which  are  related  to knowledge  diffusion  and
technology  advancement  Here  we briefly  review some  of these  effects.
Imports of dzfferentiated intermedtate inputs and capztal goods
As  first  shown  by  Ethier  (1982),  in  the  presence  of firm-level  scale  economies,  free  trade  in
differentiated  intermediate  inputs  is formally  equivalent  to technical  progress.  The reason is that
imports  of intermediates  allow  a finer  division  of labor which  increases  firms'  efficiency  A similar
reasoning  applies  to imports  of differentiated  capital  goods.  Further,  through  imports of  inter-
mediates  and capital  goods,  domestic  firms  can  benefit  from foreign  innovations  incorporated  in
these  goods  This argument  is particularly  relevant  for  developing  countries  In  a dynamic  ex-
tension  of Ethier  (1982)'s  model,  Rivera-Batiz  and  Romer  (1991)  have  also  shown  that,  under
certain conditions  (indeed quite restrictive),  trade  in differentiated  intermediates  can permanently
increase  the rate  of innovation  and growth  14  Finally,  as  shown  by  Lee  (1993),  if capital  goods
are  capital-intensive,  then  trade  liberalization  reduces  the  price  of capital  goods  in  capital-poor
developing  countries,  thereby  increasing  the return to  investment  and the  growth  rate of capital
stock  in these countries;  similarly,  trade  liberalization reduces the price of imported technology  in
developing  countries, thereby  stimulating technology  advancement.
"'See Mtendiler  (2002)  for  a  pielinhmnary  attempt  at  evaluating  the  impact  of  foreign  intermediate  inputs  on
p1o(hict.ivity  (hange
22Foreign dzrect tnvestment
Foreign  investment  can  generate  several  benefits  for  the  host  country.  For  instance,  it can
finance  the expansion of industries  in which the domestic country enjoys a comparative advantage.
Further,  it can lead to the transfer of knowledge from  foreign to local firms.  Finally, it can  provide
local firms with the critical know-how  to break  into  foreign markets
If foreign entrants possess a better technology,  they can foster productivity improvements  in the
domestic industry  either  directly, by  raising the productivity  of the resources  used in production,
either indirectly through knowledge spillovers to local firms  As far as the latter effect is concerned,
local  firms  can  learn  from foreign  firms  either by  simply observing  them,  or through turnover  of
labor, as employees  move from  foreign  to local firms.
Learning by exporting
It  is often  argued,  mainly  on the  basis of anecdotal  evidence,  that there  are several  channels
through which  domestic exporters  can benefit  from the technical  expertise  of foreign buyers.'5 In
particular,  breaking  into  foreign  markets  allows  firms to acquire  knowledge  of international  best
practice  Further, foreign buyers often provide their suppliers with technical assistance and product
design in  order to  improve  the quality  of imported  goods.  It  has  also  been  noted that  in some
cases foreign buyers transmit  to their suppliers  located in  low-wage  countries  the tacit knowledge
acquired  from their other suppliers located in technologically  advanced countries.  Hence, exporting
may foster  learning and productivity growth
Aside from these beneficial effects,  trade liberalization  has also been argued to have potentially
negative dynamic  effects for developing  countries.  These negative  effects can  be thought  of as the
dynamic counterpart  to the static gains from  specialization  based on comparative  advantage.  For
instance,  as shown  by  Lucas  (1988)  and Young  (1991),  in the presence  of sectoral asymmetries  in
the  relevance  of learning-by-doing,  a developing  country  which in the  free trade  regime  switches
its production  mix toward  technologically  stagnant  sectors  may suffer  a permanent  reduction  in
liSee,  ?rote,  alea,  World  Bauk (1993)
23its rate of productivity  growth  Similarly,  Grossman  and Helpman  (1991)  have  shown that trade
liberalization  can  adversely  affect  the  rate  of innovation  and  growth  in  a  human  capital-poor
developing  country by diverting its resources away  from R&D  Further, Rodrik  (1988)  argues that,
if firms invest  in superior technology  to reduce  their  costs,  then their incentive  to invest depends
positively  on output.  It follows  that trade liberalization  may reduce the incentive  to invest in new
technology  for firms belonging to the import  competing sectors,  since these sectors should contract
after trade  hberalization
In  the previous section,  we have  already shown that there is evidence  of trade-induced  produc-
tivity gains  in the developing world,  and that these  gains  are larger  for import competing  firms
Hence,  the  available  micro-level  evidence  suggests  that the  potentially  negative  effects  of trade
reforms  are  actually  offset  by their  positive effects  In section  7,  we  will  report  more  micro-level
evidence  on the  effects of trade reform in India  In the rest of this section,  we discuss the empirical
relevance  of some  of the mentioned  channels  of international  technology  diffusion
4.1  The import channel  of technology diffusion' 6
In the absence of plant-level studies on the link between  imports and productivity  growth,  here  we
briefly discuss  the evidence based on  more aggregated data  Coe and  Helpman (1995)  is one of the
first attempts to perform a rigorous test of the relevance of imports as a vehicle for the international
transmission  of technology  Using a sample  of OECD  countries,  these  authors  ask  how much  of
a  country's  total  factor  productivity  can  be explained  by  domestic  and  foreign  R&D  activities,
where  the latter  is  crucially  defined  as  the  import  share-weighted  average  of partner  countries'
R&D  activities  Coe and  Helpman find that both  domestic  and foreign  R&D  have  a positive  and
significant  effect on domestic TFP. Further,  for small countries  (only), the TFP elasticity to foreign
R&D  is  significantly  larger  than  that  to domestic  R&D.  Similarly,  using patent  data,  Eaton  and
Kortum  (1996)  find that innovations  that originate abroad explain more  than 90% of productivity
"'See  also  Barba Navaretti and  Tarr (2000)  and Keller  (2001a)  for  two recent  surveys  of interna-
tional trade  and  technology diffusion.
24growth of small OECD countries,  and that more than half of these innovations originate from only
three countries,  i e,  the U.S.,  Japan  and Germany 17
Coe,  Helpman  and  Hoffmaister  (1997)  extend  their  analysis  to  a  large sample  of developing
countries.  One important  difference  is  that import  shares  are  computed  by considering  imports
of machinery  and equipment  only,  since  these goods  are more  likely  to embody  new  knowledge.
Their results strongly suggest that intermediate  goods imports  raise total factor productivity also
in  developing  countries  Meyer  (2001)  restricts  even  further  the  definition  of imports  used  to
compute import shares by considering machinery only and finds that in this case the TFP elasticity
to foreign  R&D  in  developing  countries  is  twice  as large  as  in the case  in which  all  imports are
used to compute  foreign R&D.
A recent paper by Barba Navaretti and Soloaga  (2002) looks at the role of imported machines  in
transferring embodied technological progress.  They use data on unit values of machines exported by
the EU  to a sample of neighboring developing and transition countries in Central-Eastern  Europe
and  in  the  Southern  Mediterranean.  Here,  unit  values  proxy  for  the  technological  complexity
of machines  The  authors  find  that  imported  machines  have  a positive  impact  on  total  factor
productivity,  and that  the impact  is larger  the  higher  the  technological  complexity  of imported
machines.
The  above  studies  examine  the  link between  '-'FP,  R&D  and imports  at the  aggregate  level
However,  as noted  by Keller  (2001b),  R&D spending is  highly concentrated  by industry  For in-
stance, about  80% of total manufacturing  R&D is conducted in only four 3-digit  ISIC industries  in
OECD  countries  (chemical  products, electrical  and non-electrical  machinery  and transport equip-
ment)  Therefore,  Keller  performs  separate regressions  for the sample of low-R&D  industries and
finds that TFP elasticities  are significantly smaller  in these industries.
To  sum  up,  preliminary  evidence  using  aggregate  data  suggests  that  imports  are  a  highly
relevant channel  of international  technology diffusion,  and that the domestic  productivity effect of
1
7See  al,,o  S.hiff  and Wang  (2002)  and  Schiff  and  Olarreaga  (2002)  for an  analysis  of trnde-related  technology
diffilsioll
25knowledge originating abroad is greater the smaller the size and the lower the level of development of
the domestic country, and the greater both the technology intensity of industries and the complexity
of imported machines
4.2  Foreign direct  investment
Haddad and  Harrison  (1993),  Aitken and Harrison  (1994)  and Harrison  (1996)  are among the first
to  use plant-level  panel data to  analyze  the impact  of joint  ventures and  foreign  subsidiaries  on
local firms' productivity  in developing countries.  These studies  ask two related questions,  namely,
whether  foreign  firms  exhibit  higher productivity  levels  than local  firms,  and whether  knowledge
spillovers  from  foreign  to  local  firms raise the  latter's productivity  level  Data  come  from three
developing countries, Cote d'Ivoire  (1975-87),  Morocco  (1985-89)  and Venezuela  (1983-88).  Foreign
firms are defined  as all firms  with  foreign equity  that exceed  5% of assets
As far as the performance of foreign  relative to local firms is concerned,  these studies find that,
consistent with other evidence,  foreign firms generally exhibit  higher total factor productivity,  pay
higher wages and have  much higher import  and export  propensities.'
8
A more  interesting  question  is  whether  local  firms benefit  from  spillovers  generated  by their
foreign  counterparts  Aitken and Harrison  (1994) test  this hypothesis  by  assuming that, if knowl-
edge  is transmitted from foreign  to local firms, then the productivity  of the latter should be higher
in  sectors  with  a larger  foreign presence  They  use a panel  of Venezuelan  firms  to estimate  the
following  Cobb-Douglas production  function:
log Y,,t = log A,,t + a,  log SL,t + a2 log UL,,t + a3 log M,,t + a4 log K,,t  (17)
Here,  Y,,t is output of firm i in sector J at time t, A is total factor productivity,  SL is skilled labor,
UL is unskilled  labor,  M is raw materials, and K is capital stock.  In order to  capture the effect  of
8 Tlie  (evidence  on  total factor productivity  growth  is  mixed.  In  particular,  only  in  the  case  of Venezuela  TFP
gi owtli  ib hugher  for  foreign  firms  The  converse  is true  for  Mexico,  and  the  (lifference  is  insignificant  for  Cote
( 'Ivoiro
26foreign  presence on local firms' TFP, A is modeled as follows:
log A,t = bi + b2FDI 3 t + b3D, + b4Dt + e,t  (18)
where FDI,, is the share of foreign firms (as measured  by the share of foreign assets in total sector
assets) in  sector j  at time t,  D, and Dt are sector  and time dummies,  respectively,  and e,t  is  an
error  term.  A positive  effect of foreign presence on  local firms'  TFP should show up as  a positive
and significant  coefficient  b2.
Estimation results critically depend on whether or not sectoral dummies D,  are included  in the
regression.  When sectoral dummies are excluded, the coefficient  b2 is  positive and significant.  This
suggests  a positive correlation  between  fbreign presence and local firms'  efficiency.  The correlation
may  be spurious,  however,  since  foreign  firms may  be  attracted  to  sectors  in which  local  firms
make higher profits.  In fact, when controiling for unobserved  fixed industry characteristics  through
sectoral  dummies,  b 2 turns negative  and highly significant.  Notice that  in this case only temporal
variation  in  the FDI variable  is  exploited  to estimate  b2,  which suggests  that increased  foreign
presence  has  a negative  short-run  impact on local  firms'  productivity.  One  possible  explanation
for  this result  is  that foreign firms reduce  the market  share of local firms,  thereby reducing  their
capacity  utilization.  Another possibility  is that foreign firms,  by paying higher  wages,  attract the
best  workers, thereby  reducing the productivity  of local  firms.
The above  results  are broadly consistent  with the available  micro-level evidence  on transition
countries.  In particular,  Djankow  and Hoekman  (2000)  use firm-level  data for the Czech Republic
during the initial post-reform  period  (1992-1996)  to investigate the impact of foreign  direct invest-
ment  and joint ventures on the productivity  of Czech  firms  They find  that both FDI and joint
ventures  have  a positive  impact  on  TFP growth  of  recipient  firms,  although  the  impact  of the
former is greater.  This result suggests that parent  firms transfer  more Inowledge to local  affiliates
than foreign  firms do to local partners.  Further,  and most important,  Djanlcow  and Hoekman find
a large  negative  overall  impact of FDI  and joint ventures  on the TFP  of local  firms  that do not
27have foreign  partnerships.  This negative effect  becomes much smaller,  however,  when only FDI  is
considered.
Although  the  micro-level  evidence  suggests  the absence  of positive horizontal  spillovers  from
FDI  in  developing  and transition  countries'9,  there is a growing  literature  providing evidence  of
positive vertical  spillovers  from FDI  In  particular,  as noted by Smarzynska  (2002),  it is possible
that researchers  have  been  looking  for  FDI  spillovers  in  the  wrong  place.  The  reason  is  that,
since  multinationals  have  an  incentive  to  prevent  any kind  of spillovers  that would  increase the
productivity  of  their  local  competitors20,  but  also  want  to  transfer  information  to  their  local
suppliers,  FDI spillovers  are more likely  to be vertical  than  horizontal in  nature.  In order  to test
this hypothesis,  Smarzynska  uses  firm-level  data  from  Lithuania  for the period  1996-2000  She
finds  evidence  of  positive  vertical  FDI  spillovers through  backward  linkages  and no  evidence  of
horizontal  FDI  spillovers.  Similarly,  Blalock  (2001)  and Kugler  (2000)  find evidence  of positive
vertical FDI  spillovers using, respectively,  a panel of Colombian and Indonesian firms.
Hence,  it is fair  to conclude  that, while  the available  plant-level  evidence  strongly suggests  the
absence of positive horizontal FDI spillovers in the developing world,  it also suggests  that relevant
productivity  gains may accrue  to developing  countries'  firms due to  the linkages between  foreign
firms and their local  suppliers.
4.3  Learning by exporting?
The micro-level  evidence  shows  a positive robust  correlation  between  exporting and productivity.
There are two plausible  non incompatible explanations for this stylized  fact.  One is that, as shown
by  Melitz  (2002)  and  discussed  in Section  2,  more  efficient  firms self-select  into export  markets
The other  is  the learning-by-exporting  argument,  according  to  which  exporting  causes  efficiency
gains.  Two recent papers  address  the question  of the direction  of causality.  Bernard  and Jensen
"The  only  available  micro-level  evidence  of positive horizontal  spillover effects  comes  from developedl  countries
Sev  Haskel et  al,  200)2,  for a  bttidy oii  UK  dlata
2'As  Lioted by  Simarzynska,  this can  be achieved  thro,igh trade  secrecy,  or  by paying higher  wages  or by  locating
in  indtstries  or countries  where local firms  have limilte(d  imitative capacities,  etc
28(1999)  use  data  relative  to  U.S. manufacturing  plants  for the  period  1984-1992  They  find that
size,  wages, productivity and capital intensity are all higher for exporters  relative to non-exporters.
They  also  find  clear  evidence that  good firms  become  exporters,  since  performance  is  higher ex-
ante for exporters.  However, they do not find evidence that exporting improves performance,  since
productivity  and wage  growth are not higher ex-post  for exporters relative non-exporters
Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998)  address the same question and reach similar results.  They use
plant-level  manufacturing data for Colombia (1981-1991),  Mexico (1986-1990)  and Morocco  (1984-
1991)  Their approach  is  based on the  idea that,  if exporting  fosters  productivi';y  growth,  then
the productivity trajectory  of exporting firms should change after they break into foreign markets
To  test  this  hypothesis,  they estimate  econometrically  the reduced  form  of a  theoretical  model
derived from  the hysteresis  literature  (Baldwin,  1989;  Dixit,  1989)  which explicitly  considers  two
possible explanations for the correlation  between exporting and productivity,  namely,  self-selection
and learning-by-exporting
In  particular,  they  estimate,  indtistry  by industry,  by  full  information  maximum  likelihood
(FIML),  the following two-equations  system
.1  .
=  1  if  O.X, t++P,et+EZ'/3n(AVC,t-j)+Eby,t-,+  (19)
J-I  .7=1
+7.7,t  <  0;  and  y,t = O  otherwzse
1,  .'1  *1.
ln(AVC,t)  =  yn  + y,ln(et) +  EZy[ln(K,,) +  E yjln(AVCt-j) +  Eyj,'y,.  ±+v,t(20)
7-1  2J=i  J=i
Equation  (19)  represents  the export  market  participation  decision  by  plant  2  at  time  t  It  is  a
dynamic  discrete  choice  equation  in  which  Y,t  takes  a value  of one  if the firm  d-ecides  to export
and a  value  of zero otherwise  Here,  X,t  is  a vector  of exogenous  plant  characte-istics,  e,  is  the
real exchange  rate  (which proxies  for changes in relative  prices that  are common to all plants), the
summation of the terms AVC,t 7 is a distributed lag in the average variable  cost (which proxies  for
marginal  cost),  the summation  of the terms yt ,-  is a distributed lag in the participation  variable,
29and  ,,  is a disturbance.
2'  This equation  allows to test whether,  after controlling  for plant-specific
characteristics,  for movements in industry relative prices and for past export participation decisions,
past realizations  of marginal costs are  negatively  correlated with  the decision to break into foreign
markets  If this is the case,  we can conclude that,  ceteris paribus, firms experiencing  a productivity
increase  (as proxied  by a fall in  marginal costs)  are more likely  to be exporters
For  all  countries  and for most  industries,  FIML estimation  results  show that the sum  of co-
efficients  of the  distributed  lag in  marginal  costs  is  negative.  Individual  coefficients  are  never
significant,  however,  (maybe because  of the high collinearity  among them)  and  some  of them  are
positive  In sum, these results provide weak evidence in favor of the hypothesis that firms improving
their relative performance  self-select  into foreign  markets.
22
Equation  (20)  allows  to  test  the  learning-by-exporting  hypothesis.  if  firms  experience  cost
reductions  after  entering  foreign  markets,  then,  after  controlling  for  firm-specific  differences  in
capital  stock  (KXt-)  and  in  past  realization  of  marginal  costs,  we  should  observe  a  negative
correlation between export  experience and marginal costs  FIML estimation results show, however,
that the coefficients  -y' on  lagged export  experience  are generally  insignificant  In some cases they
are  significant,  but  with  the  wrong  (positive)  sign.  Only  in  a  few  cases  these  coefficients  are
negative and significant,  e.g,  in the  Moroccan  apparel  and leather  industries.
23
In short, these results  do not support the learning-by-exporting  hypothesis  21  There are several
reasons,  however,  to  be  cautious  in  interpreting  the results  In  particular,  since  the time  span
covered  by  the  data is  very short,  the  econometric  analysis  can  only  pick  up  gains  in efficiency
which  materialize  in the  short-run  (within  three years)  Further,  even  if these  gains  materialize
immediately  (which  is  quite unlikely,  given  that  learning  is a  gradual  process),  in  the short-run
they  can  be offset  by  the sunk entry  costs  associated  with  becoming  an  exporter.  Indeed,  sunk
21In  Irboth cqlations,  the disturbance'  are composed  of  ,,nobserved  plant randorn  effects  plis tranmitory  noise
2 2FIML  estimation  resuilts also  show that,  in  all  countries  and  all  industries, firms  with  large (apital  stocks  are
mole  likely  to  become exporters  Fiurther,  firms  with past  export  experience  are more likely  to  be exporters  This
lattel  result  is conibibtent  with the literatuire  on  hysteresis
2  FIML  ebtimationi results  of eqiiation  (20)  also  show that firms with  a  larger  capital  stock  have  lower  niaiginal
(osts,  and that  marginal  costs ten(d to  follow  a second  order auitoregressive  process
24Note,  howevei,  that  inlike  the  above  imientioned  works,  Kraay  (1999)  findb  evidence  of  leainuirg-by-exportirig
ufte(ts  musilig  ai panel  of 2105  Cbuiiebe  furius fiom  1988  to 1992
30entry  costs  may  contribute to  explain  the positive  and  significant  correlation  betv.een  exporting
and marginal costs found by the authors in  some cases.  Hence,  this  evidence simply suggests  that
becoming  an exporter  does not generate  short-run  efficiency  gains 25
M  Thade, 9 Tachxology  a=d  WIage  LequalHiy  ln  Dzvelping
Countries
According  to the traditional trade theory,  trade liberalization  should pose no serious distributional
issues in  developing countries.  The reason is that, since developing  countries are high-skilled labor
scarce relative to industrial countries,  their trade-induced  specialization  in low-skillcd  intensive ac-
tivities should increase  the relative demand  for low-skilled labor, thereby reducing  vage inequality
in  these  countries.  This  prediction  has often  been  used  to argue  in favor  of trade  liberalization
in developing  countries,  since it would both increase  efficiency  and lower  wage  dispersion in these
countries
The  empirical  evidence  on  wage  inequality  in  developing  countries  seems  to contradict  this
optimistic prediction.2"  As shown,  inter alia, by Robbins  (1996)  and Harrison  and Hanson  (1999),
many  developing  countries  experiencing  drastic  trade liberalizations  in the  recent  past,  such  as
Chile, Mexico,  Costa Rica and Uruguay,  have  seen a concomitant  mcrease  in wage  inequality and
a generalized increase  in the relative  demand for skilled labor  (i e,  skill upgrading).
This puzzling evidence  has stimulated  an impressive body of research  by  way of new explana-
tions  of the link between  trade  and labor markets  Here we  briefly  review  the main explanations,
25Also,  as  correctly  noted  by  the  authors,  their  approach  does  iiot  allow  to detect  efficiency  gains  accriiing  to
workers  in  the form  of hligher wages,  buit  that leave  average variable costs  unchanged
'('The  prediLtioll  iS based  on the simple Stolper-Sainuelson  theorem  However,  as  noted  by  Tiurrini  (2(002),  ui a
muore  realistic  higher (limensional  setting,  i e , in  the  prebence  of  muany  countries,  sectors  and  produlctioln  factors,
it  is  hard to  disrern empirically  in  which  factor  *.  cointry is  relatively  abundant  and  in  which  trade conitext  that
factor  is  going  to  gain  fron  trade  hiberahzation.  For instance,  Turrim  perfornms  computable  ,enreral  eqlillibriuim
simLlations  to  bhow that the  effects  of  trade liberalization  on  the  relative  wage  of the  unskilled  in Latin  Ameiica
(ritically  depends  oil  whether  or not agricultutre  is also  liberalized  A  iu  iilar  point  is  madte by Hlalrubon  and Hanson
(1999)  They  argute  that the  dramatu  increaise  in  wage  inequality  after  the  1985  trade reform  irn ?lexico  dloes  inot
necessauily  couitra(lict the Stolpei-Saninelson theorem  The retason  is that,  prior to reform,  protection in Mexico  was
skewed toward  low-bkilledl  intensive sectors,  and  it fell  mobt  in these  sectors after trade  reform.
31focusing on their  implications for labor market  outcomes in  developing  countries.
Outsourczng
Feenstra and Hanson (1996)  formulate  a model  with capital  mobility and a continuum  of pro-
duction  activities  with  different  skill-intensities.  They  show  that  trade  and  investment  liberal-
ization  bring about  North-South  outsourcing  of production  activities  which  are at the same  time
unskill-intensive  relative  to other activities  performed  in  the North,  and skill-intensive  relative to
activities  performed  in  the South  The main  implication  is  that,  contrary  to  the standard  two-
sector  Heckscher-Ohlin  model,  trade and investment liberalization  increase the relative demand  for
skilled  labor  in  both  regions,  and can  thus  potentially  explain  the worldwide  increase  in the  skill
premia
The  argument  put  forth  by  Feenstra  and  Hanson  is  consistent  with  the  main  stylized  facts
concerning the labor market dynamics  in both the developed  and the developing  world  Its empir-
ical relevance  deserves further  scrutiny,  however.  As argued,  for instance,  by Robbins  (1996),  this
model  can be relevant  for countries, such  as Mexico,  that experienced large  FDI inflows  in the last
decades.  It is less  so, however,  for much of trade-liberalizing  Latin America,  which  did  not receive
substantial  FDI in the  1980s.
Intra-rndustry  trade and wage znequaltty
Dinopoulos,  Syropoulos  and  Xu  (1999)  are  the first  to investigate  the potential role  of intra-
industry  trade  for  wage  inequality  They  build a  one  sector  model  which features  monopolistic
competition  and plant-level  increasing returns to scale on the production  side,  and love for variety
on the consumption  side  As in  Krugman  (1979), they  assume that the price  elasticity of demand
faced by  each  producer  increases  with the number  of competitors  Further,  they  assume  that the
skill-intensity  of production  increases  with firm  size.  In  this model,  trade liberalization  raises the
number  of competitors,  which implies  that prices  fall  As  a consequence,  some firms  are forced  to
exit,  thereby raising  the average  size  of surviving  firms  The effect  of trade on the  skill premium
follows immediately  from the assumption that firm size is skill-biased  This latter assumption  finds
32support in several  plant-level empirical  studies,  e.g.,  in Idson and  Oi (1999),  who report that large
firms tend to employ a higher proportion  of skilled workers.
Related  work  by  Epifani  and  Gancia  (2002)  illustrates  a  new channel  through  which  intra-
industry  trade may increase  wage  inequality.  The authors  formulate  a two-secto-r  general  equilib-
rium model which features  monopolistic competition  in both sectors  to show that an elasticity  of
substitution in  consumption greater than one and higher scale economies in the skill-intensive sec-
tor imply that any increase in the volume of trade, even between identical  countries, is skill-biased.
The intuition is simple.  Trade expands the market size of the economy,  which is beneficial because
of increasing  returns.  In relative  terms,  however,  output increases  by  more in the skill-intensive
sector,  since it  is characterized  by stronger  economies  of scale,  and the relative  price of the skill-
intensive  good therefore falls.  With an elasticity  of substitution in consumption greater  than one,
the demand for skill-intensive goods increases  more than proportionally,  raising their share of total
expenditure  and therefore also the relative wage of skilled workers.
This result implies that, if the skill-biased scale effect is strong enough to overcome  the standard
factor  proportions effect,  international  trade  will spur inequality even  in the skill-poor  developing
economies,  making  the  model  consistent  with  the  evidence  of  rising  skil1-premia  in  developing
countries  that have experienced trade  liberalizations.
The authors  also show that physical capital accumulation  leads to higher skill premia,  and that
the  intersectoral  mobility  of capita:  is likely  to  magnify  the effects  of trade  integration  on  wage
inequality.  These findings are consistent with both the evidence on capital relocation towards  skill-
intensive  sectors  (Caselli,  1999)  anc the large literature  on capital-skill  complementarity  (Krusell
et al,  2000).
Manasse  and Turrini  (2001)  are  the first  to study the effects of intra-industry  trade on  labor
market  outcomes  in  the  presence  of heterogeneous  firms  and workers.  They build  a one  sector
monopolistic  competition trade model a  l1  Krugman  (1980).  Production of each  variety involves a
constant marginal  requirement in terms of a raw input and one unit of skilled labor as a fixed cost.
33Workers are heterogeneous  in  terms  of skills  High-skilled  workers  produce  high quality  varieties
and  earn  higher  wages,  since  quality  is  valued  by  consumers  Trade  liberalization  has  striking
implications  for  income  distribution.  Because of foreign  competition,  all firms  loose market shares
in  their domestic  market.  At the same  time,  the  access  to foreign  markets  represents  a concrete
opportunity  to  expand total  sales  and  profits  only for  some  firms  The  reason  is  that access  to
foreign markets entails a fixed cost  Hence,  only those firms  whose profits are higher than the fixed
cost of exporting can effectively  break into foreign markets  As a consequence,  high-skilled  workers
employed  in  firms  producing  high  quahty  goods  see  their  earnings  rise  after  trade  integration.
Conversely,  less-skilled  workers  employed  in  firms  producing  only  for  the  domestic  market  see
their earnings  fall  after trade  integration  Thus,  the  model provides  a trade-induced  mechanism
of reallocation  of resources  and increasing  wage  dispersion which  operates at the firm rather  than
the sectoral  level.  Further,  it  is  in  line  with  the  plant-level  empirical  evidence  (reported  below)
showing that changes  in the skill premia are significantly  associated with the export status of firms.
Dhade-znduced skill-biased technical change
The  main  alternative  explanation  for  the  worldwide  increase  in  wage  inequality  is  exogenous
skill-biased  technical  change.  It  has  been  argued  that  technology  can  be  at  the  root  of the  in-
crease  in inequality  because  recent  innovations  in the  production  process,  such  as the widespread
introduction  of computers,  have  boosted  the  relative  productivity  of skilled workers 27  A recent
literature  on  dzrected technical change, initiated  by Acemoglu  (1998,  1999),  asks whether  the bias
of technological  change is  endogenous.  In these models,  innovation  originates in the skill abundant
North  and  is  then exported to  the South  An important  implication  is that innovation  responds
to economic  incentives  in the North  In  particular,  it is  shown  that skill-complement  innovations
are  more  profitable  in  a country  relatively  endowed  with skilled  workers  This  implies  that the
skill bias  of technological  change depends positively  on the relative  endowment  of skilled workers
in the  North  This result  may  help  explain  the  puzzling concomitant  increase  both  in  the  skill
27Sec,  uniong others,  Autor  et al  [1Y981
34premium and  in the relative supply of skilled  workers  experienced  by most  advanced  countries  in
the last decades.  The intuition  is that the increase  in the relative supply of skilled workers,  which
would ceteris paribus depress  the skill premium, strengthens the incentive to skill-complement  in-
novations.  Under certain  conditions  (in particular,  a high elasticity  of substitution  between  high
and low  sldlled-workers)  the latter effect prevails  and determines  a rise in the skill premium  in the
North.  As  far as  the South  is  concerned,  since it passively  adopts the  technology  developed  for
the needs of the North,  it is  bound to import more  and more  skill-complement  machines,  with  a
consequent  generalized  increase  in the relative demand  for skilled labor and in the sldll premium.
The literature on directed  technical change  can also shed light on the relation  between interna-
tional trade and the sklll bias of technical change  It is shown, in particular, that North-South trade
liberalization,  by  increasing the  relative price  of skill-intensive  goods  in the Norlb,  increases  the
profitability  of skill-complement  innovations  relative  to  unskill-complement  innovations,  thereby
magnifying the skill bias of technical  change.
It  is  worth  mentioning  two  other  recent  works  investigating  the  link  between  international
trade  and  technical  choice.  Neary  (2001)  formulates  a  general  oligopolistic  equihbrium  model
where a reduction  in trade  barriers encourages  more strategic  investment  by incumbent  firms in
order  to deter  entry.  In particular,  it is shown that, as the number  of competitors in  an industry
increases  after  trade  liberalization,  each  firm  has  a greater  incentive  to  increase  its  investment
in  order to  improve its position  in the strategic  oligopolistic  game.  Strategic  over-investment  by
incumbent  firms  thus raises  the ratio of fixed to  variable  costs  Assuming  that fixed investment
costs are skill-intensive relative to variable costs,  the model predicts that a move towards free trade
induces a higher sklll premium, a higher ratio of sldlled to unskilled workers in all sectors (i.e., skill
upgrading)  and little changes in trade volumes.  Hence, the model predicts  that trade liberalization
can  affect  technical  change  and skill premia even in the  absence  of significant  increases  in actual
trade volumes  28
"
8There  is  auother  important  channel  through  which  trade  may  increase  wage  inequality  im  the  presence  of
oligopoilstic markets  For  inbtante,  Borja.  and  Ramney  (1995)  formullate  a  model  where  the tradedl  sector  ib  an
35In the same vein,  Ekholm  and  Midelfart-Knarvik  (2001)  develop  a model where trade hberal-
ization  affects the technical choice of firms and can thus  lead to skill-biased technical change  They
assume  the existence of two technologies  one  is characterized  by a high  (skill-intensive)  fixed cost
and  a low  (unskill-intensive)  marginal  cost,  while the other features  a low  fixed  cost  and a high
marginal  cost  It  is  then shown  that the  market  size expansion  induced  by trade  liberalization
increases  the relative  profitability  of firms  characterized  by a high fixed  cost and  a low marginal
cost,  thus inducing  the adoption  of the more  skill-biased  technology
5.1  Plant-level evidence  on the determinants  of skill upgrading
5.1.1  The  role of imported technology
A  recent  work  by  Pavcnik  (2000)  is  one  of  first  attempts  to  analyze  the  determinants  of  skill
upgrading in  developing  countries  She uses data on 4547  Chilean  manufacturing plants spanning
the years  1979-1986.  Chile  represents  an interesting  setting to study the  relation  between  trade
liberalization  and  skill  upgrading  in  developing  countries  since,  between  1974  and  1979,  most
non-tariff barriers  were  eliminated  and tariff rates  were  reduced  from  more  than  100%  to  10%
Following this drastic trade  liberalization,  from  1979 to  1986,  the share of skilled workers in total
manufacturing  employment  increased by  almost  17%,  and the  skill premium  grew  by more  than
10%
One possible explanation for these trends is the following.  Falling trade and investment barriers
bring about  a  decrease  in the  relative  price of imported  technology in  developing countries  such
as Chile,  thereby  stimulating  technology  adoption  29  If the adoption of new technology  is a skill-
intensive activity,  then skill upgrading  and rising skill  prernia may  be  closely  linked  to the trade-
induced process  of technology  advancement
oligopoly and  is low-skille(d  itensive relative  to the rest of the economy  Firms and  workers  share oligopolistic  rents
in  the  tiaided  sC(tor  In  this  setting,  .n  exogenotis  increase  in  imports  reduces  rents  in  the  oligopolistic  se(tor,
thereby  ied,in.ng  the  relative  wage  of  the  unskilled  Hence,  the  trade-induiced(  fall  of  rates  of  retiurns  in  highly
o,ii(eiitiatecl  and  iiiionizecl  industries,  such  as the automobile  industry,  masy contribute  to a  worldwide  increase  in
wage inequality
')Thc  evidence  reported  by  Eaton  cud( Kortim  (1996)  confirms  that the  international diffusion  of technology  is
signifialitly  influenced  by  the degree  of piotectionisrn
36The data used by Pavcnik provide several  plant-level  variables to measure technology,  such as
imported  materials,  expenditures  on patent use and rights,  and expenditures  on foreign technical
assistance.  All  of these technology  measures,  together  with new capital  investment,  show  a dra-
matic increase in  the period following  trade liberalization.  In order to test whether skill upgrading
in Chile was  influenced by the process  of technology  adoption,  Pavcnik partitions plants according
to whether  or not  they used imported materials  (or  received  foreign  technical  assistance,  or used
patented technology)  in the years following the trade  reform  She then studies the distribution of
the wage bill  share of skilled  workers  (which  proxies  for plants'  skill-intensity)  for the twso groups
of plants.  The results are striking:  the distribution of the wage bill share of plants investing  in new
technology  is markedly  right-skewed with respect  to that of non-investing  firms, which  means that
the probability  of observing  a skill-intensive  plant is  much  higher  among plants investing in new
technology.  This  result suggests  that technology  adoption  is  a skill-biased  activity,  so  that plants
endowed with  a higher  share  of skilled worlkers  invest more in new technology.
Pavcnik  also performs  a regression  analysis  which  confirms  that technology  measures  are pos-
itively  correlated  with the plants'  share  of skilled  workers.  However,  the  correlation  disappears
when plant-specific  fixed  effects  are included  in the estimating equation.  Hence,  the  evidence  re-
ported  by  Pavcnik  does not  allow  to  conclude  that plants  investing  in  new  technology  become
more skill-intensive over  time.  However,  the strong evidence  reported  in the paper  concerning the
skill-biased nature of investment  in new technology still  helps explain within-industry  skill upgrad-
ing,  as  firms  investing in  new  technology,  thanks  to their  investment,  expand  their employment
share  relative  to non-investing  firms.  In other  words,  it is  the  reallocation  of resources  towards
more skill-intensive plants, rather than plants' skill upgrading,  which might explain  why industries
become more skill-intensive  over time.
5.1.2  The role  of exporters
While  Pavcnik  (2000)  focuses  on  the  role  of  imported  technology,  a  related  paper  by  Bernard
and Jensen  (1997)  centers  instead  on the  role of exporting plants for  skill  upgrading  and  wage
37inequality.
3 0 Contrary to previous studies on the determinants  of skill upgrading in manufacturng,
that  analyze  within-industry  and between-industry  shifts  in  employment  using fairly  aggregated
data,  Bernard  and  Jensen look  at  the contribution  of individual  (exporting  and non-exporting)
plants  to  the  aggregate  increase  in  the  relative  demand  for  skilled  labor.  In particular,  they ask
whether  skill  upgrading  and  the rise in the skill premia  stem from within-plants  increases  in the
relative demand for skilled labor pr from a reallocation of resources  toward the more skill-intensive
plants  The question  is  of particular interest  since it can shed light on the relative  contribution of
trade and technology  to the increased demand for  skilled  labor.  More precisely,  within-plants  skill
upgrading can  be mostly attributed  to skill-biased  technical change,  i.e, to changes  in production
practices  (such  as the  widespread  introduction  of computers  and  related  technologies)  that have
increased  the  relative  demand  for  more  educated  workers.  On  the other  hand,  between-plants
employment  shifts  can  be  mostly  attributed  to  cross-plants  demand  shifts,  and  in  particular  to
trade-induced  demand shifts.
The decomposition performed by Bernard and Jensen reveals that between-plants  shifts explain
46%  of the total increase  in the relative  demand for  skilled labor and  58% of the total increase  in
the skill premium  These results stand in sharp contrast to previous studies carried at the industry
level,  where  the  within-industry  component  explain  virtually  all  of the  increase  in  the  relative
demand for skilled labor (Katz and Murphy,  1992;  Berman, Bound and Griliches,  1994), and hence
suggest  that decompositions  based  on industry-level  data hide  substantial  within-industry  plant
heterogeneity  and  potentially overestimate  the importance  of skill-biased  technical change.
In  order to determine  the role of the export status of firms for the dynamics of relative  wages
and employment,  Bernard  and Jensen  look at the contribution  of exporting plants  to the  within
and between increases.  They find that non-exporters  have a within effect on relative  employment
21% larger  than exporters,  whereas the between effect  on employment  is entirely  explained by the
exporters  As for  wages,  the role  of exporters  is  even stronger  The within  effect  on wages  is  26%
'41The  lata  uised  by  Bernard  and  Jensen  come  from  U S. manLfactiring plants and  cover  the  period  1973-1987
Samuple plants account  foi  almost  two  thirds of total  manufacturing  employment  in  the U S.
38larger for exporters than non-exporters,  whereas  the between  effect on wages  is entirely  explained
by  the  exporters.  These  results  suggest  that  the  rise  in  wage  inequality  is  due  to  employment
gains  at exporting plants,  even  though skill upgrading is taking place  at both exporters and non-
exporters.
Finally,  in order to test more directly the role of technology  and product demand  shifts for labor
market dynamics,  Bernard and Jensen regress the within  and between  components of relative wage
and employment increases on changes in export sales, domestic sales and technology variables,  such
as  the change  in  the  R&D  to  sales  ratio or in  computer  investment  The  main  results are  that
between-plants changes  (both in wages and employment)  are strongly positively related to increases
in both  foreign  and domestic demand,  with the  coefficient  of the former  three times larger  than
the  latter  The impact  of technology  measures  on  the  between  components  is  instead  weaker.
These results suggest that the between-plants  movements of workers  and wages,  which are crucial
for the increase  in  the skill premium,  are largely  determined  by demand  shifts  across plants  and
in particular  by  export  demand  shifts.  As for  the impact  of demand  increases  and  technology
variables  on the within  components  of wage  and employment  increases,  it is shown,  instead,  that
the impact of technology measures is relatively stronger than that of demand increases,  confirming
that within-plants  skill upgrading is mainly  driven by skill-biased  technical change.
The main conclusion from the work of Bernard and Jensen is that looking at plart-level evidence
instead  of aggregate  industry-level  data reveals that  trade-induced  demand shifts  are responsible
for substantial relocation  of resources  across plants, and in particular  in favor of exporting plants,
and that this might explain much of the recent  increase  in  wage inequality.
T  Tadle and LaTicr  ElE-R:i  astk ties
In the previous  section we have summarized  the main findings  of the theoretical  and empirical  lit-
erature on the determinants of the rise in wage inequality in trade liberalizing developing countries
However,  the rise in wage  inequality  is not the only adverse  effect  of globalization  on the welfare
39of workers  A  new  strand  of literature,  initiated  by  Rodrik  (1997),  argues  that  there are  more
subtle  ways  through which  globalization  may  reduce the welfare  of workers  and jeopardize  social
stability  The main argument,  set out informally  by Rodrik,  is that reduced  barriers  to trade  and
investment  exacerbate  the  asymmetry  between  groups  that  can  cross  international  borders  and
those that  cannot.  The former groups, which  include skilled  workers,  professionals  and owners  of
capital,  are  freer to  take  their  resources where  their  reward is  highest  The latter groups,  which
mainly include  unskilled  workers,  are instead tied to  their country  of origin because  they are  less
capable of taking advantage  of the richer  menu  of opportunities  offered by the global market.  The
main consequence  is that the demand for  large segments of the working population  becomes more
elastic,  since these workers can be more easily substituted by other workers across national borders.
Rodrik  argues  that  a  trade-induced  increase  in  labor  demand  elasticities  has  the  following
adverse  consequences  for the welfare of workers:  1)  a shift of the incidence  of non-wage  labor costs
towards  labor and  away  from  employers;  2)  more  uncertainty  due to more  volatile  responses  of
wages  and employment  to  any exogenous  shock to labor  demand,  3)  a reduced  bargaining  power
of workers.
Given  the relevance  of the labor demand  elasticity for the welfare of workers,  it is useful  to see
more  formally how  it  can  be influenced  by trade liberalization.  As shown  by Hamermesh  (1993)
and Slaughter  (2001),  an industry's labor demand  elasticity,  77,  can be decomposed  as follows
77 =  [1- sIE + sa  (21)
where s is the labor share of total industry revenue,  e is the constant-output elasticity of substitution
between labor and all other factors of production, and (7 is the industry product-demand elastlcity 31
Equation (21)  shows that 97  consists of two parts  The first, [1-s]e,  captures the substitution effect.
It  tells,  for a  given  level  of output,  how much  the mdustry  substitutes  away from  labor towards
other  factors  when  wages  rise.  The  second  part,  sCr,  captures  the output  effect:  higher  wages
it  equation  (21)  all  the elasticities  are  defined  to be  positive
40imply higher costs and thus a lower demand  for an industry's output, which translates  into a lower
demand  for labor.  Thus,  both the substitution and the output effects  contribute  to reduce labor
demand when wages rise.  Finally, note that the higher the share s of labor in total cost, the higher
the relative importance of the product  demand elesticity for the labor  demand elasticity.
Note that trade  liberalization  can influence  the elasticities  e and a, and thus also  the derived
labor demand elasticity 77.  First consider (. As shown in Section 2, trade models based on imperfect
competition  generally  imply  that trade  liberalization  increases  the product-market  demand  elas-
ticity  Consider  now  the constant-output  elasticity of substitution  e between  labor and  all  other
factors.  Suppose  that  an  industry  is  vertically  integrated  with  a number  of production  stages.
With international  trade, stages can move abroad either within firms by establishing multinational
corporations  with foreign  affiliates  (as in Helpman,  1984),  or by buying the output of those stages
from other firms  (as in Feenstra  and Hanson,  1996).  Trade thus gives  access  to foreign production
factors either directly through foreign affiliates or indirectly through intermediate  inputs.  As a con-
sequence,  trade and investment  liberalization  expand the set of factors an  industry can substitute
towards in response to higher domestic  wages, thus increasing  e.
To  summarize,  trade and investment  liberalization  can potentIally increase  the labor demand
elasticity  either by increasing  the product-market  demand elasticity or by increasing  the elasticity
of substitution  between  labor and all  other  production  factors.  Next,  we turn  to the  empirical
evidence  to see  whether trade liberalization  actually increased  labor demand  elasticities.
6.1  Evidence  on  patterns in  1ezoar denmad eRasticities
6.1.1 lEndustry-level  evidence
The first rigorous attempt to estimate the impact of international trade on labor demand elasticities
is provided by Slaughter (2001).  He uses the NBER Productivity Data Base to estimate time series
of labor demand elasticities  from  1961 to 1991  for production  and non-production  workers for U.S
manufacturing  overall and for eight manufacturing  industries.  The estimated  elasticities  are then
41regressed  on  several  trade  measures  to  see whether  patterns  in trade  can  explain  the estimated
patterns in the labor demand elasticities
The main trade  measures used  by Slaughter  include exports,  imports or net exports as a share
of shipments, measures  of trends in transport costs  (e.g., the ratio of c i f  import value to customs
import  value), measures  of outsourcing  (e g,  the share  of imported  intermediates),  multinational
measures  (e.g, foreign  affiliate  share of U.S.  multinationals'  total employment),  et cetera.
The main  findings  of Slaughter  can  be summarized  as  follows  In the period  of analysis,  the
demand  elasticity for production  labor has increased  in manufacturing  overall  and in most manu-
facturing  industries  (in particular,  it has almost doubled  since the mid-1970s)  On the other hand,
there is  no sign  of an increase over time in the demand elasticity for non-production  labor (indeed,
this elasticity  has fallen in the last  decades)
As  far  as the effect  of trade  on production  labor  is concerned,  Slaughter  finds that most of his
trade  measures  have a  positive  impact  on  the elasticity  of demand  for  production  labor  and are
generally  statistically  significant.  The results  turn insignificant,  however,  when time dummies  or
a time trend are included in the regressions  32  One  possible explanation for the lack of robustness
of trade measures to the inclusion  of time controls  may be the high collnearity between  time and
these  trade measures.  However,  the  high statistical  significance  and  robustness  of the coefficient
of the time trend suggests  that time  is picking up some force  constantly making production  labor
more  elastic  over  time  In  this  respect,  it  is likely  that  it  is  not actual  trade  that matters,  but
rather  potential trade.  That is,  what might matter  for labor demand  is just the ability  to transact
internationally regardless of whether such transactions actually occur  Thus, trade might be playing
an important role independent  of changes in observables such as trade and foreign direct investment
flows.
Finally,  as far  as the effect  of trade on non-production  labor is concerned,  Slaughter  finds that
many  of his  trade  measures  have  a  negative  and  significant  effect  on  the elasticity  of  demand
i 
2Sinilarly,  using data from a broad  sample of OECD countries,  Bruno, Falzoni  and Helg  (2001)  find little  impdct
of various trade measures  on  labor demand  elasticities  in most  of these  cotntries
42for non-production  labor,  and that,  contrary  to the  case  of production  labor,  these  measures  are
generally robust to the  inclusion of time  controls.
6.1.2  Plant-level evidence
Krishna,  Mitra  and Chinoy  (2001)  use Turkish plant-level  data spanning the course  of a dramatic
trade liberahzation  to test whether greater openness led to an increase in labor demand elasticities.
Until  the early  1980s,  the manufacturing  sector  in  Turkey  received  an extraordinarily  high level
of protection  the  average  tariff  in  1981  was  estimated  to  be  49%  Further,  for  over  half  of
the products,  tariff  equivalent  of non-tariff  barriers were  estimated  to be  over  100%.  An  import
liberalization  program  was announced  in December  1983  and implemented  soon Efter,  leading to
a dramatic  fall of both tariff and non-tariff  barriers.
Krishna et al  use annual data from the  Turkish manufacturing census for  10  three-digit  ISIC
industries  covering all plants in the greater Istanbul area and spanning the years 1983-1986.  Eight
of the  ten  industries  saw  a dramatic  fall  in  protection  after  trade  reform.  The  labor demand
elasticity  is  estimated  for  each  of the  tcr  industries  separately,  including  firm-specific  dummies
to control  for  firm heterogeneity  The  main result is  that, although  most elasticit:cs  are precisely
estimated  and fall in a reasonable  range, estimates  of the changes  in labor demandl  elasticities are
small in  magnitude  and largely  insignificant 33
The failure  to reject the nul of no changes  in labor demand  elasticities  is somewhat  surprising,
since  previous  studies  using  the  same  date.  (e g,  Levinsohn,  1993)  strongly  suggest  that  trade
liberahzation  in Turkey  led to substantial  increases  in product-market  demand  elasticities  From
(21)  we  know  that higher  product  demand  elasticities  should  have  translated  into higher  labor
demand elasticities.  One possible explanation for this contradictory  evidence  is that labor demand
decisions  by firms  are  subject to  several frictions,  so that it takes  time before  changes  in product
demand  elasticities  lead to observable  chEnges in  labor demand  elasticities
iFajozylber  arid Maloney  (2001)  mse  plant-levcl  panel daita  for  Chilc,  Colombia  and  Mexico  iurosb their periods
of  lefoinm  to estimate  labor  demand  clasticities  ii these  countries  Their  resuilts  show  little  evidence  of structural
lbieaks  aftei  trade  reform  in  these  countrieb, and of trade-iiduLed  increases  in  labor  deruand  elasticities
437  Evidence on the Effects  of Trade Reform in India
7.1  Salient  aspects of trade and investment  reforms
Until  the late eighties  India's economic  system  was highly  regulated,  so much  to lead some com-
mentators  to lump (erroneously,  according to Basu and Pattanaik,  1997, p 123) India together with
Russia and China as examples of centrally planned  economies  In June  1991, following a balance of
payment crisis, a newly elected government manifested  its willingness to undertake  deep structural
reforms  and introduced  drastic policy changes in the subsequent years.  The main features  of these
policy  changes can  be summarized  as follows
The  trade pol2cy  regime changed  abruptly  and dramatically.  Prior  to the  reform,  it  was  one
of the world's most regulated and  protectionist trade  regime,  characterized  by  severe quantitative
restrictions  and very high  import tariffs.  On the export side,  there were  both export  controls  and
export  incentive  schemes.  Following  the reform,  the maximum  tariff was  reduced  from  400%  to
150%  in July  1991 and still further later to reach  64% in 1994.  The average  tariff was reduced from
128%  to  94%  in  1992  and  then  to  55%  in 1994.  In  1992,  import  hcences  were  abolished  except
for  a group  of sectors  mainly producing  consumption  goods.  Export  subsidies  and  controls  were
abolished
The  industrial  poltcy was  completely  overhauled.34 Most barriers to entry into industries  were
removed.  Industrial  licensing was  abolished  in almost  all  sectors.  Controls  over  investment  and
expansion  by  large industrial  firms  were  also relaxed,  while the list  of industries  reserved  for the
public sector was  drastically  reduced.
The forezgn investment policy was  also completely  restructured  Prior to  the  reforms,  India's
policy toward  foreign  investment  was  very  restrictive  Equity participation  was limited  to 40%,
except in  a few high-tech  or export-oriented  sectors.  With the reform,  this limit was raised to 51%
and foreign  investment  was  permitted  in a  much larger  number  of sectors.  Further,  the  Foreign
34 Sec,  %utev ai,a, Jha (2000)
44Investment  Promotion Board  was created  to stimulate FDI in  India and the  coun, ry entered into
bilateral  and multilateral  investment  guarantee schemes.
Finally,  the  exchange rate regzme was restructured  The highly  controlled  regime based  on a
chronically  overvalued exchange rate was dismantled.  In 1992, a dual exchange rate was introduced,
and in  1994 the  rupee  became  fully  convertible  on the current  account.  The capital  account  has
not yet been liberalized.  The restructuring  of the exchange  rate regime  was accornpanied  by  two
substantial  devaluations  of the  rupee  However,  due to  an  immediate  pass-through  to  domestic
inflation,  the real  devaluation of the :upee was less  than  7%  (annually)  in  the years  following the
reforms.
In the rest of this section,  we  review the  main empirical  studies that use firm  and plant-level
panel  data  to investigate  the effects  of this dramatic  trade  and  investment  liberclization  on  the
performance  of Indian  manufacturing  firms  and labor markets.
7.2  T[rade liberalization  and  flrm performance  in JTndian  m  ufacturing
Two recent  studies,  Krishna and Mitra (1998)  and Balakrishnan et al.  (2000),  provide an attempt
at a rigorous test of the effects of trade liberalization on firm performance  in Indian manufacturing
Both studies use firm-level  data obtained from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE)
In both  papers,  the empirical  analysis  draws  on the methodology  developed  by Ilall  (1988)  and
Harrison  (1994),  which  allows  to  examine  the  effects  of the  1991  trade  liberalization  on  firms'
mark-ups, productivity  growth and the degree of exploitation of returns to scale.  Notwithstanding
these similarities,  the  two papers reach  completely different  conclusions.
The data used by Krishna and  Mitra (1998)  spans  the years  1986-1993  and cover  the following
manufacturing  industries:  Electronics,  Electrical machinery,  Non-electrical  machinery  and Trans-
port equipment.  The  authors find  that  in  all industries  except  Electrical  machiiery  there  were
ieductions  in returns  to scale  after  1991.  This  reduction  in returns  to  scale  may  reflect  an  in-
creased exploitation  of returns to scale  by firms  operating at too small a scale prior to  the reform.
45Krishna and Mitra also find evidence  of significant  reductions  in mark-ups  in the same industries
in  the years following the  reform.35 Finally, they  find evidence  of increases  in the growth  rate of
productivity  (ranging from  3 to  6%)  in  all industries except  Transport  equipment.  This evidence
suggests that  the 1991  trade  liberalization  in India was  associated  with  a strong pro-competitive
effect leading to falling mark-ups, to an increased  exploitation  of scale economies and an increased
growth rate of total factor  productivity.  Notice  that these  effects  are in line with  the predictions
of the simple model illustrated  in Section  2.
The  data  used  by  Balakrishnan  et  al.  (2000)  span  the  years  1988  to  1998  and  cover  the
following  manufacturing  industries  Machinery,  Transport  equipment,  Textiles, Textile  products
and Chemicals.  In contrast  to Krishna and Mitra  (1998),  these authors find a 1% fall in the annual
rate  of productivity  growth  in  the post-trade  liberalization  period.  Further,  they  find  a  slight
increase  (rather  than a reduction)  in  returns to scale after the trade reform,  although  the returns
to scale estimated  by these authors for the pre-reform period are much lower than those estimated
by  Krishna  and  Mitra  (1998).  Indeed,  Balakrishnan  et  al.  (2000)  find  evidence  of  decreasing
returns  to scale, whereas  Krishna  and Mitra  (1998)  find evidence  of strong increasing  returns  to
scale in all sectors except Electrical  machinery.
Given the substantial overlap between the time periods  and industries covered by the data used
in  the two studies, the striking  differences in the  results are likely  to be  caused by  differences  in
the methodology  used  to measure  factor  inputs  and  in the  econometric  strategy.  In particular,
Balakrishnan  et al.  (2000)  use the fixed-effects estimator,  use instrumental  variables to control for
the endogeneity of  factor inputs and pool together firms belonging to different sectors  In contrast,
Krishna  and Mitra  (1998)  use the random-effects  estimator,  do not control  for the endogeneity  of
inputs and perform separate regressions  for  each sector.
Finally,  notice that, similar to Balakrishnan  et  al.  (2000),  other works find  a reduction in the
rate of productivity  growth of Indian firms in the post-liberalization period.  Srivastava  (2000)  uses
''Foi  Electrical  muachinery,  Krishna  and  Mitra find  a slight increase  in  the mark-up  They argue,  however,  that
iiiirk-up estimates  for  this industry are httle reliable
46data for  about 3000 Indian companies  for the period  1980 to  1997  He  finds  a decline in the rate
of productivity  growth  in the 1990s as compared  to the 1980s  Kumari  (2000)  uses firm level data
relative  to engineering industries (electrical  and non-electrical  groups) for the period 1985 to 1995.
She  finds that productivity  growth of engineering  firms  has declined  in  the post-reform  period as
compared  to the pre-reform  period
To sum up, contrary  to  other trade liberalizing  developing countries,  the available  micro-level
evidence  does not allow yet to discern the effects of the  1991 trade reform  in India on firms' mark-
ups,  on  the  degree  of  exploitation  of returns  to scale  and  on productivity  growth.  Aside  from
methodological  issues  (see  section  3.2),  one possible  explanation  for this  lack of positive  results
is that India  is still  a highly  regulated  economy,  and hence  the expected  beneficial  effects  of the
trade-induced  reallocation  of resources  will take  longer to materialize.
7.3  Trade and technical  eintciency of -ar--c-.m  ZuifactuIriLg  27>MS
Parameswarn  (2000)  uses firm-level  data to analyze  the evolution  of technical  efficiency  of Indian
firms.  The  data  (obtained  from  COvIE)  span  the  years  1989  to  1998  and  are  relative  to  640
firms belonging  to four industries  Electrical machinery,  Non-electrical  machinery,  Electronics  and
Transport  equipment.  In order  to estimate  technical  in/efficiency,  the author uses  the stochastic
frontier  production  approach developed  by Battese and Coelli (1995),  which  involves estimating a
production  function  of the type
Y= f (k.,  lt,rn,t,  t)  - u,t + E,t  (22)
where  all  variables  are  in  logarithms,  and  y,t  is output  of  firm  i  at  time  t  The  function  f(-)
represents  the  frontier  technology,  whose  inputs  are  physical  capital  (k,t),  labor  (1,,),  materials
(m*t)  and time t (to  allow the frontier  to shift  over  time)  C,t  is an error  term, and  u,t  is  a non-
negative  random  variable that captures  technical inefficiency  Parameswarn  asks which  variables
affect technical  efficiency  in Indian  manufacturing industries.  His main findings are the following.
47Technical  efficiency  (-u,t)  is  positively  and  significantly  correlated  with  R&D  intensity  in  all
sectors,  suggesting  that R&D  activities may  contribute  to  reduce  technical  inefficiency  of Indian
firms  Export intensity has a positive effect on technical efficiency  in all sectors except Electronucs,
where  it has  instead a negative  and  significant  effect  on  technical  efficiency  Technology  import
intensity  has a positive  and  significant  effect  on  technical  efficiency  in  Electrical  machinery  and
Transport  equipment  and a negative  and  significant  effect  in the other  two  sectors  The  negative
impact  of technology  imports  on  technical  efficiency  in  high-tech  sectors  such  as  Electronics  and
Non-electrical  machinery  is  indeed  surprising.  Another  surprising  finding  is  that  in  all  sectors
technical  efficiency  is negatively  correlated with  a time dummy variable  which takes  a value of zero
up to  1991 and a  value of one  thereafter  Hence,  trade liberalization  seems  to  be associated  with
an increased  average technical  inefficiency  in Indian manufacturing
One  possible  explanation  for these  results  is  the  failure  by Indian  firms  in the  adoption  and
mastering  of new technology  Another  possible explanation  is  that trade liberalization  may  have
changed the kind  of technology  imported  by Indian  firms  In  particular,  technology  imports  may
have shifted  away from technology  which contributes to profits and productivity within  a relatively
short time lag and toward technology which makes a more direct contribution to firms'  technological
capabilities but requires a longer gestation lag  If this is the case, this shift in the kind of technology
imports  may  contribute  to  explain  why  most  studies  find  that  trade  liberalization  in  India  is
associated  with a reduced productivity  growth
7.4  Trade liberalization  and R&D  effort  in Indian manufacturing
Kumar  and  Aggarwal  (2000)  use firm-level  data for  the period  1992-1997  to  study the  trend and
determinants  of R&D activity  in Indian  manufacturing  after trade liberalization.  The analysis  is
motivated  by the  concern  for  the declining  importance  of R&D  activity in  India.  In particular,
while  the proportion  of world CDP devoted  to R&D  has steadily increased  in the last decades  to
reach 2 5% in the 1990s,  the opposite occurred in India, where the proportion  of national  resources
48devoted to R&D fell from 0.98% in 1988 to 0.66 in  1097.  Since more than 70% of R&D expenditure
in India  is  financed  by  the government,  much  of this  downward  trend  is explained  by the fiscal
reform  of the  1990s,  which  drastically  reduced  investment  expenditure  and subsidics  to  firms  in
order to reduce the fiscal  budget  deficit.  At the micro-level,  the evidence  shows different  patterns
in R&D expenditure  between  local firms  and  MNE affiliates  in India.  In particular,  while in the
1990s the average R&D intensity  (the ratio of R&D spending to sales) of local firms is still slightly
higher than that of MNE affiliates  (0.854% versus 0.818%, respectively),  the trend for local firms  is
declining (from 0.868%  to 0.831%),  while that for MNE affiliates is steadily increasing  (from 0.766%
to  0 852%)  These  trends suggest an  increasingly  central  role of MNE  affiliates  for technological
upgrading  of Indian manufacturing.
The firm-level econometric  analysis performed by Kumar and Aggarwal shows that firms'  R&D
intensity  is positively and significantly correlated  with technology imports, outward orientation  and
capital  goods  imports.  However,  when  performing  separate  regressions  for local  firms  and MNE
affiliates, it turns out that, in contrast to local firms,  MNE affiliates'  R&D effort  is not correlated
with export intensity  and capital goods import intensity.  MNE affiliates'  R&D intensity is instead
positively correlated  with their  profitability,  as measured  by the price-cost  margin.  According  to
the authors, one possible explanation  for thcse findings is that local firms direct their R&D  activity
toward absorption of imported  technology and outward expansion.  In contrast,  given their captive
access to the laboratories of their parents and associated  companies,  MNE affiliates'  R&D effort is
primarily directed  toward customization  of  their parents'  technology  for the local market  in those
activities that are more profitable.
7.5  Employment effects  of trade reform :n  indiarn mam￿uactzr:ng
According  to  the traditional  trade  theory,  trade  liberalization  expands the  (comparative  advan-
tage) exporting sector  at the  expense of the (comparative  disadvantage) import  competing sector.
However,  this trade-induced  sectoral reallocation  of resources  has  no effect  on aggregate  employ-
49ment, because of the assumption  of factor market  clearing.  In practice,  in the presence  of frictions
in the labor market and of a sluggish intersectoral  mobility  of resources,  a drastic  trade liberaliza-
tion, such  as the  one experienced  by India  in recent  years,  can reduce  employment  in  the import
competing  sector  and  thus  raise  the short-run  rate  of unemployment  Indeed,  fear  of increased
unemployment  in  the import  competing  sector has often  been  the main reason  against  trade lib-
eralization  in developing  countries pursuing  a development  strategy based  on import substitution
However,  as  noted by Harrison  and Revenga  (1994),  contrary  to the predictions  of the standard
trade theory,  most  empirical  studies find only a modest effect  of trade  liberalization  in developing
countries  on  the  employment level  in  import  competing sectors  3(i
Kambhampati et al  (1997) examine the effects of the 1991 trade reform in India on employment
in five import competing sectors 37  They use firm-level data taken from CMIE.  The data cover  the
period  1987-1993  Similar  to the results from previous studies,  they find no sigruficant  employment
effect  of trade reform overall and in each of the five sectors studied.  More interestingly,  the authors
formulate  and  test  a specific  explanation  for  the  lack  of employment  contraction  in  the import
competing sectors  They  argue that,  in  the presence  of imperfect  competition,  trade liberalization
raises  firms'  perceived  product demand  elasticity  and  hence induces  them  to lower  mark-ups  and
expand output  Hence,  the pro-competitive  effect  of trade  liberalization  may  involve  an increase
in the  demand  for  labor.  This  effect  may partially  offset  the labor  demand  reduction  in  import
competing  sectors induced  by  the forces  of comparative  advantage  38
In order to test  this prediction,  Kambhampati  et  al  (1997)  estimate  the following  equation
'It = )
3 0 + 3iWt  + P20.t + I%3kIt +  3 4m,,  + 35D + E,t  (23)
where,  1,  w, k  and  m  are  the  logs  of  employment,  real  wage,  capital  stock  and  raw  materials,
l'Sec,  for instance,  Raama (1994)  oni  Uriguay,  Revenga (1994)  oni  Mexico,  CGirrie  ancl Harrison  (1994)  oni  Moro(lo
See  also Hairison  andl Hanson  (1999)  on  Mexico  ancd  Morocco
'
7The  ive  imnport  competing  sectors  are  Electronics,  Electrical  mahinery,  Non-electrical  machinery,  Transport
equipminct  andl  a se( tor that  only includes firms  that prodiice  Diversified  prodiicts
"FiScc also Hariisoin  and Hanson  (1999)  on  this point
50respectively;  a is the price-margmal cost mark-up; D is a liberalization  dummy, which takes a value
of zero for the years  1991  and before  and a value of 1 for  the years  after;  E is a stochastic  error.
The  regression  results reported  by  the authors,  obtamed  by  using the  random-effzct  cstimator,
show that, overall  and in four  of the five  sectors  studied
39, both the real wage and the mark-up
are  negatively and significantly  correlated  with  firms' labor demand.  This evidence  suggests  that
when the import  competing sectors of a liberalizing  country are imperfectly competitive,  then the
output contraction in these sectors (and the consequent short-run surge  in unemployment) may be
much  less dramatic than expected  in the light of the traditional trade  theory.
7.6  Trade  liberalization  in  lHnia:  grPeater  uncertainty  vers-s  a  richer
menu of opportunities  ?
In Section  6,  we have  shown  that a trade-induced  increase  in product demand  elasticities should
also bring about an increase  in the derived labor  demand elasticities  As shown  by Rodrik  (1997),
this  implies  that workers  exposed  to international  competition  should face  a higher  volatility  of
wages and employment  in response  to exogenous  shocks to labor demand.  Daveri,  Manasse  and
Serra  (2002)  argue that trade-induced  increases in the  volatility  of factor prices  and employment
are only part of the story,  since firms  and workers  exposed to international competition  may also
have a greater incentive  to invest in productivity  enhancing activities,  such as training and effort,
in order  to hedge the risk of lower  incGmes.  The aim of the authors is hence  to test the empirical
relevance,  in  the  case  of India,  of what  they  call  "the  twin effects  of globalization",  i.e,  higher
uncertainty  versus  a richer  menu of opportunities  for firms  and workers involved  in international
competition.
The data  used by the authors come from a survey of 895 Indian firms belonging to five manu-
facturing sectors:  Garments,  Textiles,  ?harmnaceuticals,  Electronic consumer  goods and Electrical
white  goods.  The  data,  which  cover  the period  1997-1999,  have  recently  been  collected  by the
"'Resitltb  for  the sector producing Diversified  products turn out to be  statistically  insignificant.
51World Bank.  In order to test their hypotheses,  the authors  partition firms into  the following three
groups  Firms exporting at least 30% of their output are defined  as Exporters (they represent 37%
of the  total),  non-exporting  firms  declaring  to face  foreign  competition  in their domestic  market
are  defined  as  Import-Competmng firms (27%  of the total),  and the rest of the firms  belong to the
group  of Protected firms  (36%  of the total).  Note that firms belonging  to  the former  two groups
are  directly exposed  to international  competition  and hence,  by comparing their evolution  to that
of protected firms,  we can  infer something about  the pros and cons of globalization  Consider un-
certainty  first  Let w,t-  =,  + V,t represent  a variable  pertaining to firm t at time t (i.e, the wage
rate,  profits,  sales,  employment  or prices),  where  A, and  v,t  are is  its permanent  and transitory
components.  The  variance  of w,t  can  then  be  written as  the sum  of a'  + a2,  where  the former
represents  cross-sectional  variation  and  the latter temporal  variation  of w,t.  Hence,  a2, captures
uncertainty  due to,  e.g, wage  volatility  Performing  this  decomposition  shows that exporters  and
import-competing  firms  are characterized  by  a higher  transitory  variance  of wages,  employment,
sales,  prices  and  (to  a lesser  extent)  profits.  The  authors  also  perform  a regression  analysis  in
which the transitory  component  of firm-level  variables  is  regressed  on dummies for exporters and
import-competing firms,  sectoral and regional  dummies,  and  size.  Estimation  results show  that in
most  specifications  the dummies for exporters  and import-competing  firms are  positive,  and they
are  often  also  highly  significant  These  results  suggest  that,  consistent  with  the authors'  prior,
exposure  to  international  trade  is  associated  with greater  uncertaanty  due  to higher  volatility of
wages,  profits and employment.
Consider now the potential  pros of trade exposure  The authors focus, in particular,  on traaning
and promotions.  Their prior  is that firms exposed to foreign  competition have  a greater  incentive
to  train  their  workforce  in  order  to  increase  its  productivity,  thereby  reducing  the  uncertainty
due  to  more  volatile  profits  At  the  same time,  workers  have  an  incentive  to  produce  a greater
effort to obtain promotions,  thereby reducing the uncertainty  due to higher wage  and employment
volatility  In  this respect,  data  reveal that the share of  workers engaged  in training programs  is
5231% for exporters,  36% for import-competing  firms and only 19% for protected  firms.  Further,  the
percentage  of workers  being promoted  in the firm's ladder in  1999 equals 4% for  exporting firms,
1.4% for import competing  firms and  1.7%  for protected  firms.
The regression  analysis performed  by the authors shows that the percentage  of trained workers
is  positively and  significantly correlated  with the dummy for  import-competing  firms,  even  after
controlling  for  size and for sectoral  and regional  dummies.  Further,  they regress  thc probabihty of
a promotion on the dummies for exporters and import-competing  firms.  Estimation results reveal
that the former dummy is positive and significant,  even after controlling  for sectorel  dummies,  for
size  and for a proxy of productivity growth.
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Hence,  the evidence on Indian manufacturing firms suggests that, although trade liberalization
may have  increased  uncertainty  for  firms  and workers,  it may  also have induced  more investment
in  training of the  workforce  on  the part  of firms,  and  more effort  (aimed at promotions)  on  the
part of workers.
7.7  Trade  amnd  performance  in  Hnd  n  manufacturinag:  sorye  tenative
conclusions
The lack  of micro-level evidence  of trade-induced  productivity  gains after  trade liberalization  in
India is at odds with the experience  of other trade liberalizing developing  countries  One explana-
tion for these somewhat disappointing results is that, as noted by Srinivasan  (2001, p.  9),  "despite
radical changes in the trade policy reforms compared to the pre-1991 situation, India has remained
one of most autarkic  developing  countries".  Indeed,  as far  as quantitative  restrictions  (QRs)  are
concerned,  although  in  1991  the list of imports  subject to QRs  was  drastically  shortened,  it still
remained  quite  long  As estimated  by Pursell  (1996),  although the share  of manufacturing  GDP
protected  by quantitative  restrictions  and other non-tariff  barriers  was  reduced  from  90%  in the
4"The authors  also check the  robuistness of their results  with respect  to the methodology of estimation  In partic-
itai,  they  estimate  the  iupact of trade  exposure on  incertainty,  training  andl  promotions  uising  a non-parametric
appinao  h  which protiuces  remarkably  consibtent  resultb
53pre-reform  period to 36%  in  1996,  it remained  high  in absolute  magnitude,  mainly because  of the
very  high share  of QR-protected  consumer  goods.  As far  as tariff barriers  are  concerned,  Pursell
(1996)  compares  unweighted  average  tariff  rates  across  26  countries  for  13  product  categories
Strikingly, he finds that India's tariff rates rank highest or second highest for all product  categories
and that India's  average  tariff rate of 51.6%  is nearly  three  times as  high as the average  level  for
26  developing  countries  Hence,  more effort  is  needed  on the part  of India's  government  to reach
a degree of trade liberalization  comparable  to that  of more successful  developing countries
Another explanation  for  the lack  of positive  results may  be related  to India's endowment  and
the  structure  of world  trade  In  particular,  when  compared  to  other  Asian  countries  that  have
successfully exploited  the opportunities  disclosed by  a greater participation  in the world economy,
India  is extremely poor in  terms of human capital.  For instance,  as reported  by Bajpal  and Sachs
(1997),  in  1992,  the  adult  literacy  rate  in  India  was  50%,  while  the  corresponding  figures  for
Indonesia,  Thailand  and Korea were  84%,  94%  and 97%,  respectively.  This suggests  that,  at in
least in  the medium-run,  export-led  growth in India has to rely on specialization  in extremely  low-
skill intensive productions  This may not be that easy,  however,  since the problem of market access
is particularly  relevant  in  these sectors  As is  well known,  tariff peaks and tariff escalation  in low-
skill intensive sectors severely limit access  to industrial countries'  markets by skill-poor developing
countries.  As  a symptom  of how  serious  this problem  may  be  for  India note that,  as  shown  by
Srimvasan  and Tendulkar (2001),  in the post-liberalization  period, within manufacturing,  the share
of exports  of traditional  labor-intensive  goods  either declined  steeply  (e g.,  leather manufactures)
or remained  unchanged  (e.g.,  ready-made  garments)  In contrast,  the share of exports  of chemical
products  and engineering goods increased  substantially.  These trends suggest, among other things,
that because  of the  issue of  market  access  in low-skill  intensive  industries,  it  may paradoxically
be  easier for a skill-poor developing country to expand into comparative  disadvantage  rather  than
comparative  advantage  industries  after trade  liberalization  In this respect,  an immediate  policy
implication  is that,  as  also  suggested  by  Srinivasan  (2001),  India has  no alternative  to  actively
54participate  in  a  new  round  of multilateral  trade  negotiations  in order  to  enhance  access  for  its
low-skill intensive exports.
Finally,  several 'behind-the-border'  constraints may  have prevented  India from reaping more of
the benefits of liberalization.  In particular, notwithstanding  the government's effort at deregulating
the economy, a still excessive regulation  may have  resulted in lower mobility of resources and hence
in  little exploitation  of trade-induced  efficiency  gains  As  an  example  (reported  by  Srinivasan,
2001),  until  2000  the garment  industry  was  reserved  to the small-scale  non-factory  sector  This
constraint  prevented  the organized  factory  segment  of manufacturing,  which  is  characterized  by
much higher  productivity  per worker,  to expand into a sector of strong comparative advantage for
the Indian  economy
8  Concuions
In this  paper we  have  reviewed  the  mucro-level  evidence  on  the effects  of trade  hberalization  in
developing  countries  We  have  focused,  in  particular,  on  the  empirical  relevance  of the  effects
predicted  by the trade theory in the presence  of increasing  returns to scale, imperfect competition
and firm heterogeneity.  The main findings can  be summarized  as follows
1)  There  is indirect  evidence  of trade-induced  oroductivity  gains in the  developing  countries
opting for freer  trade.  In particular,  firms' productivity  growth  generally rises after trade reforms.
More  interestingly,  the  evidence  shows  that  the productivity  of firms  exposed  to  international
competition  (i.e.,  exporters  and  import-competing  firms)  grows  much  more  than  that  of  firms
belonging to the non-traded  sectors.
2)  The evidence suggests that output share reallocations among firms with different productivity
levels  are  the  main  source  of  trade-induced  productivity  gains.  This result  is  in  line  with trade
models, such as Melitz  (2002), in which firm heterogeneity and sunk entry costs into foreign markets
play a crucial role  in the mechanics  of efficiency  gains  from trade liberalization.
3)  Firms  in  import-competing  sectors  enjoy the highest  efficiency  gains from  trade.  One  ex-
55planation  for  this result  is that the disciplining  effect  of trade  liberalization  is stronger  in  import
competing sectors  Another  is  that the  benefits  stemming  from cheaper  imports  of (embodied  or
disembodied)  technology  are more relevant  for  firms  belonging  to  the comparative  disadvantage
technology-intensive  sectors
4)  There  is no  evidence  of relevant  scale  efficiency  gains  This  result,  which  runs counter  to
conventional  wisdom  about  the  sources  of gains  from  trade  in  the  presence  of scale  economies,
can  be  explained  as  follows  First,  the  evidence  suggests  that  large firms,  which  account  for  a
disproportionate  share  of  industry output,  are  close  to minimum  efficient  scale and  hence  their
scale  efficiency  is  unaffected  by  trade  liberalization  Second,  most  small  firms  operating  at  an
inefficient  scale are  de facto  insulated from  foreign  competition,  since they only compete  for local
market  niches  Third,  the recent  episodes  of trade  reform  in the developing  world often represent
examples of unilateral  trade liberalization,  which does not imply scale efficiency  gains.  Indeed,  the
trade theory suggests that under certain conditions  (e g , competition  d la Cournot with segmented
markets)  unilateral trade  liberalization  reduces  scale efficiency  in  the trade  liberalizing country.
5)  There  is  robust  evidence  of  a  pro-competitive  effect  of  trade  liberalization  The  pro-
competitive  effect  shows  up as reduced  price-marginal  cost mark-ups  for  firms exposed  to foreign
competition,  especially  if they  belong to  highly concentrated  industries
6) There  is no evidence,  in the short-run,  either  of learning-by-exporting  effects or of beneficial
spillover  effects  from  foreign  owned  firms  to  local firms  active  in  the same  sectors  In particular,
exporting  firms are more efficient  than non-exporting  firms,  but their productivity  trajectories  do
not seem  to  change  after  they  break  into  foreign  markets  Similarly,  foreign  owned  firms are  in
general more efficient than local firms,  but their presence  does  not seem to positively influence the
productivity of local  firms belonging  to the same sectors
7)  There  is evidence,  however,  of positive  vertical  FDI spillovers  Hence,  relevant  productivity
gains  may accrue to developing countries'  firms  due to the linkages between foreign firms and their
local suppliers.
568)  Plant-level evidence suggests to reconsider the role played international tradc  in the dramatic
increase  in wage inequality observed  in most trade  liberalizing developing countries.  In particular,
there  is  weak  evidence  that  skill upgrading  is  correlated  with measures  of impoited  technology.
Hence,  trade liberalization,  by  reducing  the price of imported  technology,  may  spur the demand
for  imported  technology,  which  in  turn  may  increase  the  relative  demand  for  sldlled  labor,  as
technology  adoption  is a skill-intensive  activity  Further,  there  is evidence  that exporting  plants
expand  at the expense of non-exporting plants  after trade liberalization.  Since the former are skill-
intensive  relative to  the latter,  this  implies  that trade-induced  output  share reallocations  among
firms  with  different  skill-intensity  can  be  a  crucial  determinant  of  industry  sklll  upgrading  and
rising wage  inequality.
9)  There  is evidence  of a substantial  increase  in the demand  elasticity for unskilled  labor and
of a stable or decreasing  demand elasticity  for skilled  labor,  although  it  is not  clear  whether the
upward  trend in  the former  is  trade-induced  From a theoretical  standpoint,  the labor  demand
elasticity  is  relevant  because its rise generally  brings about  a rise also in  wage  volatility.  As  for
the latter, however,  there  is direct evidence that firms  exposed to international  competition face a
higher wage  volatility than  firms belonging to the non-traded  sectors.
10)  There  is  no evidence  of substantial  employment  contraction  in import  competing  sectors
after trade reforms  This implies that  a dramatic short-run  surge in unemployment  is  not a likely
consequence  of trade  liberalization.  One  possible  explanation  for this  result  is that,  at least  in
the short-run,  the tendency  toward contraction  of the comparative  disadvantage  sectors  is offset
by  other  forces.  For  instance,  in  the  presence  of imperfect  competition,  trade liberalization,  by
reducing mark-ups,  may  force firms to expand  output and employment  to cover fLxed  costs.
In  short,  trade  liberalization  brings  about  efficiency  gains,  mainly  through  a  reallocation  of
resources  toward more efficient,  outvard oriented  and skill-intensive  firms.  In turn, this involves
skill upgrading,  higher wage  inequality and higher  wage volatility.  All this suggests that a greater
availability of skilled workers may magnify the efficiency  gains from trade reform, on the one hand,
57and dampen  its negative  distributional  effects  on the  other.  These  results  naturally lead  to  the
policy implication  that a successful  trade  liberalization  should be  accompanied  by policies  aimed
at improving  the  average  level  of education  of the  workforce.  This  would  in  fact facilitate  the
expansion  of more efficient  skill-intensive  firms  and the absorption  of imported  technology,  while
at the same  time reducing the  pressure on the skill premium.
As far  as  India  is concerned,  a further  policy  implication  suggested  by  the somewhat  disap-
pointing evidence  on the effects  of trade reform on Indian  firms' productivity  growth is to further
deregulate  the economy  in order to stimulate  the firm to firm mobility of resources  so as to  allow
a better  exploitation  of trade-induced  efficiency  gains
It  is worth  noting,  in closing,  that the above  results are  not  robust  enough,  however  They
are often plagued by  methodological  hurdles  (in particular,  by the difficulty to  identify  the trade
effects),  or  by the  poor quality  of the data,  and in particular  by the fact that,  while  most  trade
effects  only  materialize  in  the  long-run,  most  empirical  analyses  are  bounded,  instead,  to look  at
data which only cover very short time spans.  Empirical studies on the effects of India's trade liber-
alization  are not exempt from these problems.  This may help explain,  for instance,  the contrasting
results concermng the productivity  gains from India's trade reform.  Hence more  effort is necessary
to better our understanding  of the effects  of trade reforms in developing countries  in general,  and
in India in  particular.
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